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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides an alternative to the surge theory as a basis for 
understanding the dramatic change in the security situation in Anbar, Iraq. 
Typological theory is used to develop a conceptual framework of strategic 
interaction that explains how different combinations of government and insurgent 
repression types lead to the alignment of the affected population. Process tracing 
is used to test our hypotheses of population alignment, to make inferences about 
how the population reacted to the repression tactics of the government and the 
insurgent, and ultimately, to construct an explanation for the defeat of AQI 
through the alignment of the tribal population in the Anbar province of Iraq. Game 
theory compliments process tracing by verifying the internal logic of the typology 
and observations. In addition, the development of an agent-based model (ABM) 
verifies the internal logic and extends the external validity of the author’s 
substantive theory. The model replicates and reproduces the dynamic history of 
mechanisms and processes by manipulating the parameters that alter the affects 
of the interaction of repression tactics on population alignment. Then, theoretical 
predictions are tested against observations from the case study of the Anbar 
Awakening to assess the degree of congruence between the projections of the 
conceptual framework and the longitudinal variation of observations. The docking 
procedure of this research design confirms the utility of channeling for the 
counterinsurgent against insurgent coercion. However, the findings suggest that 
this dynamic is heavily dependent on intermediating mechanisms, such as the 
insurgent’s social embeddedness and the population’s incentive structures. 
Lastly, the feasibility and potential areas of applications for the models is 
provided. 
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The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the 
sea –Mao Tse-tung1 
 
A. BACKGROUND  
The attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in the United States (U.S.) 
declaring war on terror. The U.S. military, fashioned based on Cold War 
requirements, has seen extensive action from Asia through northern Africa in 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
U.S. military quickly defeated their targeted regimes. However, they found 
themselves in the precarious position of trying to establish political stability and 
security. A regime’s organized forces are easily defeated through the direct 
application of combat power, but winning stability and security requires an 
indirect, population centric strategy.  
In Iraq, the U.S. has been very successful disrupting and displacing Al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Anbar once qualified as Iraq’s most restive and violent 
province. Only Baghdad eclipsed it in the number of attacks on Coalition and 
Government of Iraq (GOI) forces, but the resulting death toll from those attacks 
was highest in Anbar, accounting for one third of all Coalition casualties2 (Peter, 
2008). Soldiers and Marines dubbed it the ‘Wild West,’ likening its western 
geographic orientation, tribal society, rampant lawlessness, violence, and 
conspicuous absence of governance to the western territories of the U.S. of the 
19th century.  
The chief of intelligence for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force 
Headquarters (1st MEF), which was the headquarters responsible for 
                                            
1 The quote is taken from The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75 by Burkitt, Scobell, & 
Wortzel. 
2 As of January 2008, 3,872 U.S. soldiers had been killed in Iraq. Therefore, the resulting 
U.S. deaths in Anbar would be 1,278.  
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administering Coalition Forces (CF) in western Iraq, filed an intelligence report in 
the fall of 2006 that concluded, “the prospects for securing that country's western 
Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do 
to improve the political and social situation there,” according to Washington 
Times writer, Thomas E. Ricks (2006). Subsequent events dramatically altered 
the province that once was the heart of both the Sunni resistance and Al Qaida in 
Iraq (AQI). Now, to quote correspondent Tom A. Peter, “Anbar has emerged as 
the symbol of a turnaround as Sunni sheikhs formed ‘Awakening Councils,’ 
ousted Al Qaeda, and created community police forces. Anbar is the 11th of Iraq's 
18 provinces to return to Iraqi control, but it is the first predominately Sunni 
province handed over” (2008). The strategy developed working with the Anbar 
tribes would later be exported to other areas of Iraq as the Sons of Iraq and Local 
Concerned Citizens. 
The transformation of Anbar has hence been hailed an extraordinary 
triumph for the Coalition. Therefore, the question remains, why and how did the 
awakening in Anbar take place? Many argue that this process was a direct result 
of the surge of U.S. troops into Iraq. The surge may have played a role, but the 
true success lies in understanding the dynamics that affect how individuals and 
groups make decisions to resist.  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The U.S. Department of Defense's Irregular Warfare Joint Operating 
Concept defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular 
warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full 
range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence, and will” (2007, p. 6). Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a subset of 
irregular warfare and the U.S. Counterinsurgency guide states “COIN is a 
complex effort that integrates the full range of civilian and military agencies. It is 
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often more population-centric (focused on securing and controlling a given 
population or populations) than enemy-centric (focused on defeating a particular 
enemy group)” (2009, p. 12).  
Many lessons have been learned in the years of conflict since 2001 and 
they are now being captured in the U.S. Government doctrinal publications. The 
population is the center of gravity in a government and insurgent conflict and the 
prescribed tactics are indirect and population centric. What is the indirect 
approach and how it is to be implemented in a population-centric strategy? The 
substance of an indirect approach/ population-centric strategy is required for 
troops to operationalize and implement strategy at the tactical level. As the 
situation grays, troops and commanders will gravitate to areas of clarity, 
traditional roles of conventional military operations. To get away from potentially 
counterproductive actions to control the population, it is necessary to make the 
indirect approach clear. The authors intend to formulate a theoretical framework 
to assist commanders as they develop their intent and operational concepts of an 
indirect approach to win population alignment. 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the conflict between a government 
and insurgency where the primary concern is not defeating the enemy, but to win 
the supporting population. The question this thesis attempts to answer is what 
are the strategic dynamics between the government and insurgent repression 
tactics and the relevant population’s alignment. The authors utilize various 
components of social movement theory and the research focuses on repression 
typology, strategic interaction of government and insurgent repression tactics, 
and the mechanisms and processes that account for the deviation in population 
alignment. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Typology theory supports the development of a theoretic framework that 
explains how the government and insurgent repression strategies interact 
resulting in the alignment of the affected population. Process tracing is used to 
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test the proposed hypotheses of population alignment, to make inferences about 
how the population reacted to the repression tactics of the government and the 
insurgent, and ultimately, to construct an explanation for the defeat of AQI though 
the alignment of the tribal population in the Anbar province of Iraq. Process 
tracing within a case study longitudinally explains deviation in population 
alignment, but has weaknesses. It lacks the corroboration potential of multiple 
case studies and requires estimating the causal effects of the variables. Game 
theory compliments process tracing by verifying the internal logic of the typology 
and observations. Agent-based modeling (ABM) mitigates the lack of external 
validity inherent in single case studies by verifying the internal logic of the 
substantive theory analytically. The ABM overcomes the stylized nature of game 
theory by not focusing exclusively on equilibrium. ABM captures the dynamical 
history of the mechanisms and processes by manipulating the parameters that 
alter the affects of the interaction of repression tactics on population alignment. 
The modeled predictions are tested against observations from the case study of 
the Anbar Awakening to assess the degree of congruence between the modeled 
projections of the conceptual framework and the longitudinal variation of the 
observations.  
D.  CHAPTER REVIEW 
Chapter II examines repression strategies used to control populations 
under the rubric of social movement theory. The majority of the supporting 
literature is does not directly address insurgent violence. The literature explains 
the relationship between government repression and movement dynamics. We 
build off the literature by making the insurgent a repressive actor and attempt to 
understand how the interaction of each side’s repression strategy results in 
population alignment. Chapter III uses the theoretic concept developed in 
Chapter II to deconstruct the Anbar Awakening case study by process tracing the 
events resulting in the Anbar tribes shifting allegiance from AQI to GOI/US. In 
Chapter IV, game theoretic modeling verifies the internal logic of the theoretical 
concept analytically and mitigates the lack of inherent external validity of a single 
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case study. Chapter V tests for congruence between the theoretic concept and 
the empirics of the case study. The results are the limitations, feasibility, and 
potential area(s) of application for the findings. 
 6
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II. TYPOLOGY THEORY 
Movements may occur in broad macro context, but their actual 
development clearly depends on a series of more specific dynamics 
operating at the micro level.3 (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996) 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of conflict between a government and insurgency where the primary 
concern is not defeating the enemy, but to win the support of the population. The 
question this thesis attempts to answer is what are the processes and factors 
that affect population alignment in support of the government or insurgent. To 
answer this question, the authors focus the research on three areas of interest: 
the strategic interaction model, the intervening mechanisms and processes, and 
the resulting population alignment. The strategic interaction model begins with a 
typology of repression and concludes with the model that depicts the spatial 
relationship created between the government, insurgents, and population 
resulting from the interaction of each side’s repression tactics. The mechanisms 
and processes explain the incentives to protest, how they create 
micromobilization, the framing processes, and finally introduce the intervening 
variables of mobilizing structures and transformative events. The mechanisms 
and processes explain the spatial relationships and resulting population 
alignment of the strategic interaction model. Lastly, the results are supported with 
a match-up typology created from an analysis of the government and insurgent 
architectures of power. 
First, the formulation is begun by explaining the relationship between 
repression and mobilization. Charles Tilley provides three potential relationships 
between repression and mobilization: 
                                            
3 The quote is taken from the 1990 article Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest 
by Opp and Roehl. 
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(1) that they are locally variable, irregular, or even incoherent, and 
therefore not amenable to systematic description and explanation. 
(2) that, once we clear away the conceptual and empirical debris, 
they conform to general laws. (3) that they apply names to classes 
of episodes for which coherent explanation are possible—but not in 
the form of general laws at the levels of episodes or classes of 
episodes.4 (Davenport, Johnson, & Muelller, 2005, pp. 211–212) 
Like Tilly, the mechanisms5 and processes6 are examined to explain the 
relationship between repression and mobilization7 as in Tilly’s item three because 
of the inherently complex and locally diverse nature of an insurgency. In other 
words, the nature of an insurgency often defies the logic of general laws. Using 
Tilly’s definition, an example of an episode is the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Like 
Tilly, common properties, transformed into general laws for understanding 
insurgencies (episodes) are not the pursuit of this study. Tilly contends that:  
Similar mechanisms and processes appear at the small scale in 
revolutions, strikes, ethnic conflicts, social movements, and many 
other contentious episodes, but the their varying combinations, 
sequences, and initial conditions cause dramatically different 
processes and outcomes at the large scale. Explanations of whole 
episodes therefore passes through five steps: (1) identification of 
the episodes’ problematic and distinctive features; (2) comparison 
with other episodes for similar features and differences in those 
regards; (3) identification of processes that produce those 
problematic and distinctive features; (4) decomposition of those 
processes into component mechanisms; (5) development of 
accounts concerning how relevant mechanisms combine, interact, 
and produce their aggregate effects given their specific initial 
conditions. (Davenport, Johnson, & Muelller, 2005, p. 213) 
                                            
4 Episodes are continuous streams of contention including collective claim making that bears 
on other parties’ interest (Davenport, Johnson, & Mueller, 2005, p. 212).  
5 Mechanisms are a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of 
elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations (Davenport, Johnson, & 
Mueller, 2005, p. 212). 
6 Processes are regular sequences and combinations of such mechanisms that produce 
similar transformations of those elements (Davenport, Johnson, & Mueller, 2005, p. 212). 
7 Mobilization is collective direction of pooled resources to shared interests (Davenport, 
Johnson, & Muelller, 2005, p. 213). 
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The coherent explanations apply to diverse classes of episodes. Using 
Tilly’s five-step process, it allows for a detailed analysis of an insurgency 
(episode), from a theoretical framework applicable in other COIN environments. 
B. STRATEGIC INTERACTION 
1. Repression Typology 
What is repression? Earl provides a theoretical framework for repression 
typology. In her research, she uses the 1978 Tilly definition of repression as, “any 
action by another group which raises the contenders cost of collective action” 
(Tilly, 1978; Earl, 2003). Earl (2003) identifies the importance of repression in 
social movements and identified two primary lines of research: (1) research that 
casts repression as the dependent variable; and (2) research that casts 
repression as the independent variable in the explanations of such things as 
movement mobilization and tactical adoption. Earl’s research focuses on using 
repression as a dependant variable and explaining why repression occurs.8 She 
identifies a typology of repression to explain the various forms of repression. 
Earl’s repression typology addresses the three key dimensions of repression 
characterized as the identity of the repressive agent, the character of the 
repressive action, and whether the repressive action is observable (2003, pp. 
47–48). Her typology presents 12 possible combinations of the dimensions. 
Table 1 depicts the manipulation of Earl’s typology into eight cells by combining 
the dimensions of identity of repressive agent, directness, and visibility. She 
addresses the identity of repressive agents utilizing three categories: national 
level, local level, and private agents. For purposes of this study, the national and 
local level authorities are grouped into sanctioned9 and the private agents into 
                                            
8 Although Earl’s repression typology explains why repression occurs, her typology is useful 
in explaining how repression affects population alignment. The focus of this study is 
counterinsurgency, in that political environment repression is a tool used to influence behavior.  
9 Sanctioned repression is conducted by any government entity (military) and unsanctioned 
repression is conducted by private citizens, groups, and/or other third parties (tribes) with indirect 
affiliation to the government. However, the insurgents can conduct sanctioned repression through 
formally recognized insurgent channels and unsanctioned repression through private citizens, 
groups, and/or informal associated third parties. 
 10
unsanctioned under the category of identity of repressive agent. The second 
dimension she examines is the character of repression, which the authors 
categorize as directness of repression. Directness of repression provides two 
models of repression, coercion and channeling. Earl states coercive repression 
involves shows and/or uses of force and other forms of police and military action 
(2003, p. 48). Earl further explains coercion as being either covert10 and overt.11 
Channeling involves repression that is more indirect, affecting the forms of 
protest available, the timing of protest, and/or flow of resources to movements 
(Earl, 2003, p. 48).12 Additionally, channeling involves directing repression 
against the organizational capacity to mobilize. Her third dimension of repression 
is whether the repressive action is observable; categorized as visibility, either 
observable or unobservable. Earl further explains channeling as either manifest 
(readily observable to the public) or latent (intention unknown to general public). 
The authors simplify visibility to observable and unobservable. Observable 
repression means the actions and intentions are obvious to the public. 
Unobservable repression means the actions and/or intentions are to be unknown 
to the public. The result of Earl’s work provides a theoretical framework for the 
typology of repression and standard definitions for use to explain the 
mechanisms and processes resulting in population alignment. Table 1 is a 
manipulation of Earl’s typology and provides examples of repression tactics by 
combining the dimensions of repression.13 
                                            
10 The agents of repression, their actions, and the purpose of their actions intended to be 
unknown to the public. 
11 Repression intended to be obvious to both the protestors and the wider publics. 
12 Rasler’s study of the Iranian Revolution explains that government 
concessions/accommodations encourage more protest because dissidents perceive that the 
prospects for successful collective action are better than they have been in the past and that the 
costs of collective action are more acceptable (1996). Channeling and accommodation both 
attempt to weaken the opposition and the acts are similar, but differentiated based on both sides 
architecture of power. Channeling is negotiation from a position of power (real or perceived). The 
authors contend that channeling has a negative effect on mobilization. Concessions are made 
negotiating from position of weakness (real or perceived) and can signal the opposition’s 
vulnerability. 
13 Table 1 is not an exhaustive list of examples. The table provides examples in the context 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Al Anbar Province. 
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Table 1.   Repression Typology 
2. Strategic Interaction Model 
The strategic interaction model is a 2 x 2 graphic depiction of the spatial 
relationship between the population, government, and insurgency created by the 
interaction of the government and insurgent repression tactics (Figure 1).14 The 
model was derived from Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model, Seminar in 
Guerilla Warfare (2008). The other dimensions, identity of repressive agent and 
visibility, work as the processes and mechanisms of the core model.15 As stated 
before, an insurgency does not conform to general laws; therefore, section three 
addresses why the spatial relationship exists. The strategic interaction model 
provides four possible outcomes.  
                                            
14 The strategic interaction model generalizes the tactics used in each of the four scenarios. 
For example, in type one, both the government and insurgent use coercion. However, each side 
may be using channeling as well, but the preponderance of the tactics is coercive. 
15 The incentives to protest (mechanisms and processes) capture the identity of the 
repressive agent and visibility of action. 
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Figure 1.   Strategic Interaction Model (McCormick, 2008). 
The population perceives the government and insurgent repression tactics 
as coercive in Type 1. The illustration depicts the spatial relationship between the 
population, government, and the insurgency as equal. Therefore, population 
alignment with either side is unlikely or weak. Type 2 represents the conditions 
where the government remains coercive while the insurgency is channeling. This 
illustration depicts the population aligning with the insurgency. Type 3 represents 
the government utilizing channeling and the insurgency relying on coercive 
tactics. This results in the population aligning with the government. Type 4 
represents both sides utilizing channeling tactics. Type 4 represents a 
competition in resources. The assumption is that in a COIN environment the 
government has a resource advantage; therefore, the population is shown closer 
aligned with the government. 
C. MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES 
The strategic interaction model depicts the spatial relationship between 
the population, government, and insurgency created by the interaction of 
repression tactics (McCormick, 2008). Repression has either a positive or a 
negative effect on mobilization and that effect is manifest in population alignment 
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with either the government or the insurgency. Opp and Roehl specify the 
processes on the micro level that explain the relationships between repression 
and protest on the macro level (1990).16 To determine the effect that repression 
has on the individual decision to take part in social movement activities requires 
analyzing three incentives to protest: social, moral, and public good (Opp & 
Roehl, 1990). Opp and Roehl use the three types of incentives to explain the 
indirect effects of repression set off by repressive acts by legal authorities.17 
Additionally, the intervening variables of transformative events18 and mobilizing 
structures are factored in to determine how they enhance or mitigate the 
incentive structures. The mechanisms and processes manipulate population 
alignment. The bridge between repression typology and the incentives structures 
is legitimacy.  
Micromobilization processes are more likely to occur the more 
repression is considered illegitimate, i.e., as unjust or unjustified. 
[Opp and Roehl] further assume that repression is judged as highly 
illegitimate if it is directed against legal protest action, which implies 
the [incentive structures will mobilize against the repressor] more 
often (or, for informal negative sanctions, less often) if persons are 
involved in legal actions before experiencing repression. (Opp & 
Roehl, 1990, p. 526) 
1. Incentives to Protest 
“Movements may occur in the broad macro context but their actual 
development clearly depends on a series of more specific dynamics operating at 
the micro level”19 (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 522). Micromobilization20 refers to the 
                                            
16 Mobilization is collective direction of pooled resources to shared interests (Davenport, 
Johnson, & Muelller, 2005, p. 213). Therefore, micromobilization is the individual direction of 
resources to shared interests.  
17 Opp and Roehl’s thesis examines the effects of repressive acts by legal authorities; 
however, the strategic interaction model accounts for repression tactics of both the government 
and insurgency. The repressive acts of the insurgency affect the same incentive structures of the 
population. 
18 A transformative event is a crucial turning point for a social movement that dramatically 
increases or decreases the level of mobilization (Hess & Martin, 2006, p. 249). Francisco refers to 
transformative events as focal events (2005). 
19 Opp and Roehl identify processes on the micro level that can explain relationships 
between repression and protest at the macro level (1990). 
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decision to mobilize at the individual level. An individual’s decisions are subject to 
scrutiny from their social environment. Social incentives are the expectations of 
the individual to the positive and negative sanctions of their social environment 
(Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 524). If the population perceives repression as legitimate, 
then the social environment is likely to increase negative sanctions weakening 
the ties between the insurgents and the population (sanctioned versus 
unsanctioned). Conversely, if the population views the repression as illegitimate, 
the social environment will increase positive incentives strengthening the ties 
between the insurgents and the population. Coercion or channeling is not 
determined to be legitimate or illegitimate based on the act alone. The perception 
of the person subjected to the repressive act ultimately determines its relative 
legitimacy. The dimensions of visibility and identity of the repressive actor 
influence the perception of repressive acts. If the repressive actor is 
unsanctioned and/or the repressive act is unobserved, it increases the likelihood 
that the repression is illegitimate when linked to the repressor. When the 
repressor is trying to explain away the association, unsanctioned or unobserved 
repression, they are subject to the opponents’ injustice frame. Opp and Roehl 
assume that, “micromobilization processes are set off in particular for persons 
who have been exposed to repression that they and their social environment 
(social incentives) regard as illegitimate and who are integrated into protest 
encouraging groups”21 (1990, p. 526).  
Protest encouraging groups utilize positive and negative sanctions and the 
framing processes to encourage and justify protest. This refers to Opp and 
Roehl’s moral incentives in which an individual’s obligation to protest is based on 
                                            
20 McAdam defines the micromobilization context as a small group setting in which 
processes of collective attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organization to 
produce mobilization for collective action (1988; Rasler, 1996, p. 133). 
21 Numerous empirical studies have shown that integration into groups supporting the goals 
of a movement is positively related to group members’ protest activities (see, e.g., Oberschall, 
1973; Opp, 1999; Snow et al. 1980; Useen, 1980; Opp & Roehl, 1990). 
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protest norms and norms of violence22 (1990, p. 524). Legitimate repression 
reduces the moral incentives of an individual to act on behalf of the insurgents. 
“Acting in accordance with norms or justification of protest is associated with 
good conscience, whereas inaction leads to bad conscience” (Opp & Roehl, 
1990, p. 524). Conversely, protest-discouraging groups utilized the same 
processes to discourage protest. Closely tied to moral incentives are public 
goods incentives. Public goods incentives include system alienation23 and 
perceived influence by legal and illegal political action. Protest-encouraging 
groups influence the moral and public goods incentives by way of the framing 
processes.  
Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigall-Brown’s core framing tasks capture Opp 
and Roehl’s moral and public goods incentives by way of the diagnostic,24 
prognostic,25 and motivational frames.26 Diagnostic frames appeal to the public 
goods incentives by increasing system alienation. For example, an insurgency 
frames the problem as lack of political access, placing the blame directly on the 
government. This assists in strengthening system alienation and the need for an 
alternative political order. System alienation builds on the prognostic frames by 
detailing the solution and/or plan of action by developing an insurgent movement 
                                            
22 Specifically, protest norms refers to the extent that a person should participate in protest 
generally and norms of violence denotes the extent to which a person considers violent protest 
justified (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 524). 
23 System alienation means that the political order is regarded as a public evil, that 
repression raises the process for an alternative political order that is regarded as public good 
(Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 524). The alternative political order created by the insurgency can 
alienate the population. 
24 A diagnostic frame entails a diagnosis of some event or aspect of life as troublesome and 
in need of change, and the attribution of blame for the problem. The diagnostic frame identifies 
what the problem is and who is to blame. The function of the diagnostic frame is recruitment and 
socialization. 
25 Prognostic framing involves the articulation of a solution to the problem, including a plan of 
attack and frame-consistent tactics for executing it. The prognostic frame provides a solution and 
course of action while maintaining frame consistency. Prognostic frames assist with movement 
development and participation (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Corrigall-Brown, 2007, p. 387). 
26 Motivational framing addresses the “free rider” problem by articulating the rationale(s) for 
engaging in corrective activity (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, Vliegenthart, & Corrigall-Brown, 
2007, p. 387). Motivational frames build on prognostic frames by providing for action and 
overcoming the fear of risk associated with collective action.  
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to topple the regime. The prognostic frame capitalizes on the system alienation 
created by the diagnostic frame; thus, increasing moral incentives of obligation to 
protest. The motivational frame creates the need for action by appealing to the 
collective good (public goods) and justifies the action through protest norms and 
norms of violence (moral incentives). Additionally, this overcomes the individual 
risk associated with the solution provided by the prognostic frame. The 
interpretive frame manipulates perception through application of the core framing 
tasks to achieve frame alignment.27  
Frame alignment is the conceptual bridge that links social psychological 
and structural/organizational on movement participation that consists of: (a) 
frame bridging,28 (b) frame amplification,29 (c) frame extension,30 and (d) frame 
transformation31 (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464). Frame 
alignment incorporates the core framing tasks and adjusts the interpretive frame 
                                            
27 Frame alignment refers to the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such 
that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology 
are congruent and complimentary (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464). 
28 Frame bridging refers to the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & 
Benford, 1986, p. 467). The bridging process attempts to align the ideological frames of two or 
more groups through the diagnostic and prognostic frames by identifying a common problem 
and/or who is to blame and/or solution.  
29 Frame amplification refers to the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that 
bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, 
p. 469). Frame amplification is used when the interpretive frame has failed to motivate collective 
action (motivational frame). Amplification is used to clarify or invigorate the values and/or beliefs 
that support or impede action in pursuit of the desired endstate (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & 
Benford, 1986, p. 469).  
30 Frame extension is the extension of the SMO boundaries of its primary framework to 
encompass interests or points of view considered incidental to its primary objectives but of 
considerable salience to potential adherents (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 472). 
Frame extension is much like frame bridging in that it is trying to encompass groups based on 
congruence. However, frame extension is attempting to align two or more groups through the 
diagnostic and prognostic frames by identifying a common problem and/or who is to blame and/or 
solution based on values and interest; whereas, frame bridging aligns on ideology.  
31 Frame transformation “redefines activities, events, and biographies that are already 
meaningful from the standpoint of some primary framework, in terms of another framework, such 
that they are now seen by the participants as something else” (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & 
Beford, 1986, p. 464). When the interpretive frame is failing to yield the intended results, “new 
values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and 
erroneous beliefs or “misframings” reframed (Goffman, 1974, p. 308) to garner support and 
secure participants” (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 473). Frame transformation 
allows for changes in any/all of the core framing tasks.  
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to achieve alignment. Alignment increases the probability that the incentives to 
protest will result in micromobilization by increasing the size of the group, through 
frame bridging and extension, and how well the frame resonates (frame 
amplification and transformation). When groups frame align, they are subject to 
the social incentives of the new, larger social environment increasing the 
likelihood of micromobilization through positive and negative sanctions. Frame 
alignment increases the individual obligation to protest (moral incentive) by 
manipulating the interpretive frame to compel a person to protest and to justify 
protest activity. Lastly, frame alignment increases the public goods incentives 
through frame amplification and transformation by increasing system alienation 
and the perceived influence of legal and illegal political action. The framing 
process is dynamic and is constantly reevaluated and/or adjusted to 
maintain/increase frame resonance with the target population’s incentive 
structures. The framing alignment processes link to collective action by way of 
cognitive liberation,32 “If the value of collective good is combined with a high 
expectation of success, people are likely to participate in mass action”33 (Rasler, 
1996, p. 134).  
2. Intervening Variables 
a. Mobilizing Structures 
Mobilizing structures are “those collective vehicles, informal as well 
as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 2008, p. 3). Mobilizing structures build 
organizational capacity of the insurgent organization through the 
                                            
32 The social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and immutable must come to 
seem both unjust and mutable” before collective action is likely, a process that McAdam (1982) 
calls “cognitive liberation (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Beford, 1986, p. 466). 
33 Value expectancy models assert that people will rebel if they become convinced that 
dissent will achieve collective good (Klandermans, 1984; Muller & Opp, 1986; Finkel, Muller, & 
Opp 1989; Rasler, 1996, p. 134). 
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micromobilization processes to create meso-level34 groups resulting in macro-
level mobilization. The authors’ analysis of mobilizing structures refers to the 
micromobilization, connective structures, and leadership structures.35 The 
following table depicts the mobilizing structures of a movement and provides 
examples of each.  
 
 
Table 2.   Mobilizing Structures. 
To understand the effects that mobilizing structures have on the 
incentive structures requires a comparable discussion of the regime’s 
architecture of power. Each side utilizes their organizational capacity to  
 
 
                                            
34 The focus is on the meso-level groups, organizations, and informal networks that comprise 
the collective building blocks of social movements and revolutions (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 
2008, p. 3).  
35 The leadership structures are either centralized or decentralized. Gerlach and Hine refer to 
decentralized as single leadership and the absence of card-carrying membership (Gerlach & 
Hine, 1970; Tarrow, 1998, p. 129). The connective structures (meso-level mobilization) are either 
reticulated or unreticulated. “by reticulation, they referred to a weblike connective structure “in 
which the cells, or nodes, are tied together, not through any central point, but rather through 
intersecting sets of personal relationships and other intergroup linkages” (Gerlach & Hine, 1970; 
Tarrow, 1998, p. 129). Micromobilization is characterized by either being segmented or 
unsegmented. “By segmentation, they meant that the movement “is composed of a great variety 
of localized groups or cells, which are essentially independent, but which can combine to form 
larger configurations or divide to form smaller units” (Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Tarrow, 1998, p. 
129).  
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gain/maintain social control. The interaction of organizational capacities’ is a 
dynamic process resulting in favorable or unfavorable matchups influencing the 
effects of the incentive structures. 
The intervening variable of mobilizing structures enhances or 
mitigates the effects mechanisms and processes. The mobilizing structures 
increase and decrease the sanctions from the social environment due to the 
incentives to protest and affect the micromobilization processes. Segmented 
mobilizing structures, heterogeneous and socially embedded groups, increases 
the social incentives subject to frame alignment. For example, AQI pre-2006 
(Table 2, Type 2; segmented, reticulated, and decentralized) was an umbrella 
group of Sunni insurgent groups that included 1920 Revolution, Baa’thists, and 
Ansar Al Sunna to name a few. AQI subjected the Sunni population to protest 
encouraging groups, which utilized positive and negative sanctions to justify 
violence as an accepted norm of protest and to increase alienation of the Shia 
dominated GOI/US. The interpretive frames created through the framing process 
utilized brokerage36 to align these groups based on ideology, values, and/or 
beliefs. Unsegmented (homogenous groups) increase intra-group social 
incentives and have no effect outside the group. Homogenous groups increase 
social incentives by diffusion of issue specific ideology; AQ Central utilizes the 
ideology of Islamism to impose sanctions within the group. The connective 
structures either increases or decreases the social incentives. If the coordinating 
mechanism is unreticulated (formal), the social incentives decreases because a 
consensus is not required. The Palestinian Authority is unreticulated in which 
direction the movement flows through a hierarchy. However, if reticulated, the 
social incentives increase based on the personal relationships required to 
maintain the web-like organizational structure. Hamas differs from the Palestinian 
Authority in that it has web like connective structures as opposed to being 
hierarchical. Centrality of leadership also has differing effects on the social 
                                            
36 Brokerage refers to, “the capacity to connect sectors of a movement who hold different 
stances and world views” (Diani & McAdam, 2003, p. 107). 
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incentives. A movement with centralized leadership decreases the social 
incentives due to the coordinated control of organization matters. Conversely, 
decentralized leadership increases social incentives based on the trust and 
solidarity required to maintain the organization. 
Moral and public goods incentives tie to connective structures and 
leadership through the framing process based on the requirement to coordinate 
and lead the movement. It is assumed that the increase/decrease of moral and 
public goods incentives directly relate to the difficulty the connective and 
leadership structures have in maintaining frame alignment. Social 
embeddedness increases moral and public goods incentives due to alignment 
(subject to framing processes) with the protest encouraging groups. 
Homogenous groups increase moral and public goods incentives with negligible 
framing requirements (like-minded people). In an unreticulated connective 
structure and/or centralized leadership, moral and public goods incentives 
increase due to the institutionalization of the framing process. In a reticulated 
connective structure and/or decentralized leadership group, moral and public 
goods incentives decrease due to the increased difficulty of maintaining frame 
alignment. In sum, mobilizing structures modulate the likelihood of insurgents 
coordinating action with the population. To conceptualize the government’s 
organizational counterparts of mobilizing structures, Boudreau’s explanation of 
organizational capacity through the lens of depth and breadth is examined. 
Additionally, the interaction of organizational capacities between the government 
and insurgency and the effects on population alignment is shown. 
Boudreau provides a matchup process that takes into account both 
sides’ architecture of power37 and the government’s options in a battle for control 
over a relevant population. He advances the argument concerning why state 
actors resort to repression against social challenges. He also examines the state 
                                            
37 In reference to architecture of power, it is not how much, or how far, one can project 
power, but rather how degrees of power projected from specific operational bases threaten the 
hegemonic project or ambitions of others. The structure rather than the magnitude of power is 
essential in understanding the competition between state and movements. 
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and social challenger’s depth and breadth of control38 and extends this concept 
to explain why a state may choose to repress or ignore a given protest. He 
argues that the state must achieve a balance between extending the state’s 
reach (breadth) and maintaining control over its current constituents within 
society (depth) (Davenport, Johnson, & Mueller, 2008, p. 35). Breadth differs 
from depth as the ability to control the population with security forces in a given 
geographic area as opposed to the societal aspects.  
Boudreau’s matchup process creates a theoretical typology that 
accounts for each side’s strengths and weaknesses and identifies the 
corresponding government repression strategy. Boudreau identifies two 
government options in dealing with social challenges; eliminate or diffuse (2008, 
p. 40). The authors generalize eliminate and diffuse to coercion and channeling 
to support the typology of repression. A matchup problem exists when the 
repression tactics are not consistent with the architecture of power. Table 3 




Table 3.   Matchup Typology. 
                                            
38 Boudreau defines breadth as the state’s ability to exercise power across territory (broadly) 
and depth as the control over aspects of social life (deeply) (Davenport, Johnson, & Mueller, 
2008, p. 35). 
39 Boudreau’s theoretical framework focuses on thinking about weak, poorly, consolidated 
state authorities and social challenges. 
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The matchup typology provides hypothetical outcomes based on 
the matchup of government and insurgent organizational capacities. It is 
assumed that when depth or breadth is negative (-) for one side, it is maximum 
(+) for the other (zero sum).40 The blacked out boxes represent conditions in 
which neither opponent has a comparative advantage. What remains in the 
typology are the respective conditions and the government’s ideal repression 
strategies based on each side’s architecture of power. The Al Anbar province, 
pre-2006, presented a matchup problem for the government. The GOI/US lacked 
depth and could mass security forces for breadth of control in a given area. 
Conversely, AQI enjoyed both depth and comparable breadth to the GOI/US. 
The result is a weak state (in the given area) and the need to build depth through 
channeling. The matchup typology supports the strategic interaction model41 by 
identifying the conditions in which repression tactics are plausible and whether 
they can eliminate and/or diffuse an insurgency. 
The matchup typology depicts the dynamic process created by 
comparing organizational capacities. The mobilizing structures of the insurgency 
have an effect on the incentive structures as previously stated. However, the 
effect is relative to the organizational capacity (depth and breadth) in time and 
space and can modulate over time. Regime depth mitigates the effects mobilizing 
structures have on the incentive structures. Conversely, lack of regime depth 
enhances the effects of the mobilizing structures for the insurgent. From 2004 to 
2006, the GOI/US utilized indiscriminant coercive heavy tactics, due to a lack of 
depth, to control the population in Al Anbar. The GOI/US massed security forces 
to displace AQI in strongholds along the Euphrates River Valley (ERV). After the 
GOI/US withdrew, AQI returned capitalizing on enhanced support from the Sunni 
tribal population based on increased government alienation. The following figure 
illustrates the effects of organization capacity on mobilizing structures. 
                                            
40 This assumption is made to simplify the hypothesized outcomes. To the degree one side 
possesses depth and/or breadth, the other does not (in time and space). 
41 The strategic interaction model demonstrates how the interaction of government and 
insurgent repression tactics influence population alignment. 
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Figure 2.   Comparative Advantage of Depth and Breadth. 
The x and y-axis depicts the depth and breadth of control, 
respectively. The diagonal line is the proportional organizational capacity of 
Depth and Breadth (1:1). Figure 2 is a comparative example of organizational 
capacities. In the example, the government’s organizational capacity is ¼ depth 
and ¾ breadth. Conversely, the insurgent’s organizational capacity is 
characterized as ¾ depth and ¼ breadth to depict control as zero sum. The 
government’s organizational capacity is above the proportional line, indicating a 
higher capacity for coercion as a means of control. However, more depth is 
required to achieve additional control closer to the proportional line (balanced 
capacity). This implies that the government must work through channeling to 
deepen its social control with the aim of complete control (upper right corner of 
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Figure 2).42 Additionally, this illustrates the effect organizational capacity has on 
mobilizing structures, and thus, incentive structures. The intersection of the 
government and insurgent depth along the proportional line identifies a 
comparative advantage to the insurgency.43 In this example, the mobilizing 
structures would have an enhanced effect on the incentive structures (increased 
mobilization for the insurgency).  
The organizational capacity of the government and the insurgency 
support the strategic interaction model. The conflict depicted in the strategic 
interaction model is for control of the relevant population and not the tactics used 
to target the adversary; it reflects each side’s tactics used to maintain population 
control. The government’s breadth of control supports coercive repression tactics 
and depth supports channeling repression tactics (organizational capacity 
supports the repression tactics). For the insurgency, the greater access to the 
mobilizing structures of the population, the more likely channeling tactics achieve 
population control. Control of the population is constrained by organizational 
capacity and this capacity modulates in time and space. For example, in 2005, 
the Shia-led government in Baghdad, with depth of social control in southern 
Iraq, utilized channeling to control the Shia population. At the same time, the 
Shia insurgents were also utilizing channeling to control the population, 
supported by cell 4 of Figure 3 (competition for resources). During the same time, 
the GOI/US lacking depth in the Sunni Triangle was predominantly utilizing 
coercive tactics to control the population, while the Sunni insurgents utilized 
channeling to control the population, as depicted in cell 2 of Figure 3 (population 
alignment with the insurgency).  
                                            
42 In this example, the insurgency must increase coercive capacity (breadth) to broaden their 
geographic control. 
43 The bold, dashed double arrow identifies comparative advantage of social control to the 
insurgency. The larger the gap between the intersections on the proportional line, the larger the 
comparative advantage to one side. 
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Figure 3.   Strategic Interaction Model Supported by Organizational Capacity 
(McCormick, 2008). 
b. Transformative Events 
The intervening variable of transformative event is applied to the 
mechanisms and processes to determine if they enhance or mitigate the 
incentive structures. A transformative event44 is a crucial turning point for a social 
movement that dramatically increases or decreases the level of mobilization 
(Hess & Martin, 2006, p. 249). Harsh repression and/or a transformative event 
negate the social incentives to mobilize; thus, increasing (decreasing) moral and 
public good incentives for the opposition (Francisco, 2005, p. 67). By combining 
Hess and Martin’s and Francisco’s argument, a transformative event dramatically 
increases or decreases the level of mobilization as explained through the moral 
and public goods incentive structures. A transformative event raises the moral 
obligation to protest when the repression is perceived as unjust, illegal, and/or 
                                            
44 Francisco refers to transformative events as focal events (Davenport, Johnson & Mueller, 
2008). 
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inappropriate.45 Whereas a person is normally compelled to participate in 
movement activities, the transformative event impels a person to participate, view 
protest is justified, and to see the system as alienated. The process self 
reinforces the incentives to protest allowing the protest encouraging group to 
maintain frame alignment by using the repressors actions against him.46 In an 
attempt to diffuse the opposition, “backfire can result from a political process that 
includes authorities’ [or opposition’s] tactics to manage, inhibit or promote 
outrage and which contentious actors typically attempt to oppose” (Hess & 
Martin, 2006, p. 249). Backfire, like a transformative event, increases the moral 
and public goods incentives through the safe processes. 
D. POPULATION ALIGNMENT 
The strategic interaction model depicted a spatial relationship between the 
population, government, and insurgency in response to the interaction of 
repression tactics. The mechanisms and processes applied to the strategic 
interaction model explain the spatial relationship resulting in population 
alignment, Table 4. 
                                            
45 The transformative event creates frame amplification of diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational frames and the alignment is explained through the corresponding bridging and 
extension (alignment based on ideology, values, and/or interest by common perception of an 
unjust act). The transformative event simplifies the core framing tasks by creating an interpretive 
frame resulting in frame alignment. 
46 State violence strengthens the opposition through a process called “political jiu-jitsu.” This 
is also known as the “paradox or repression” (Sharp, 1973; Schock, 2005; Smithy & Kurtz, 1999; 
Hess & Martin, 2006, p. 251). 
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Table 4.   Population Alignment. 
In typology one, coercion/coercion, the incentives to protest in support of 
either group have been negated. Therefore, the population undergoes tactical 
adaptation and forms new alliances against both the government and insurgency 
(based on threat).47 Additionally, the government or the insurgents alter their 
repression tactics and generate a new interpretive frame attempting frame 
alignment.48 The same dynamics are at work in typologies two and three with 
one side using coercion and the other side utilizing channeling. The population 
forms an alliance with the side channeling based on a common threat or cause 
posed by the coercive actor (Chang, 2008, p. 655). The negative consequences 
of the incentive structures represented in typology two are greater for the 
government when the population is characterized by decentralized, reticulated, 
                                            
47 Chang identifies an increase in organizational capacity, changes in tactical repertoire, and 
frame development as just a few of the unintended consequences of repression (Chang, 2008, p. 
652).  
48 Chang argues that for frame development to result in movement alliance/coalition it must 
unite based on common threat or cause (2008, p. 655). Common threat is likely to align 
heterogeneous groups and common cause is likely to align homogeneous groups (Chang, 2008, 
p. 655).  
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and segmented networks; whereas, the same network configurations enhances 
the expected positive outcomes for the government in typology three.49 In 
typology four, both sides are positively influencing the incentive structures. 
However, in a COIN environment, it is assumed that the government has a 
resource advantage resulting in the population alignment. 
E. CONCLUSION 
A comprehensive COIN strategy addresses the key task of establishing 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. A framing contest 
considering the interaction of the repression tactics with the mechanisms and 
processes determine legitimacy and influence. Building a course of action begins 
with an analysis of each sides’ architecture of power and properly employing 
(match-up) resources to achieve the desired depth and breadth of power in a 
given time and space. The theoretic framework does not conform to general laws 
to determine population alignment in a COIN environment. However, 
manipulating the mechanisms and processes, taking into the consideration the 
uniqueness of the situation, can achieve population alignment. 
                                            
49 The inverse argument is also true for the insurgents. This is representative of the 
enhancement/mitigation of the incentive structures by the intervening variable of mobilizing 
structures. 
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III.  CASE STUDY: ANBAR AWAKENING 
Iraq experienced a spreading social movement, expanding along 
kinship lines that could best be described as a tribal rebellion 
against al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) by a large body of accidental 
guerrillas who had formerly allowed themselves to be exploited by 
the takfiris. (Kilcullen, 2008) 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter builds on the typology chapter through empirics of the Anbar 
Sunni tribal population and the population control measures utilized by AQI and 
GOI/US. The independent variables (IV), GOI/US and AQI repression tactics, 
explain the dependant variable (DV) of tribal alignment. The repression tactics 
result from process tracing the key events and decisions of AQI and GOI/US to 
create a repression typology. The mechanisms and processes facilitate an 
understanding of the deviation in the DV (tribal alignment) illustrating the spatial 
relationships depicted in the strategic interaction model. The structure of the 
chapter centers on two general timeframes: 2003–2006 and a transitional 
timeframe50 because these timeframes display the deviation in the DV. 
Before analyzing the specifics as they relate to the Anbar region of Iraq, it 
is important to identify two generalizations as they pertain to the situation in Iraq. 
The first deals primarily with the insurgent composition in Iraq. Although many 
different elements have joined the insurgency, all Sunni insurgent activity are 
attributed to AQI.51 The second relates directly to the manner in which the 
authors refer to the Coalition Forces and government. The Government of Iraq 
                                            
50 The transitional timeframe does not have hard dates for the beginning and end because 
the transition varied in time and space throughout the Al Anbar province. The timeline generalizes 
to late 2005 through the spring of 2007 to include the events associated with the formation of the 
Sunni Awakening, the U.S. coalition surge, and the drastic reduction of violence throughout the Al 
Anbar province. Additionally, transition refers to the Sunni tribal population shift alignment from 
AQI to the GOI/US. 
51 Al Qaeda in Iraq formed in 2004, but it was an evolution and compilation of various Sunni 
insurgent groups who activity began in the summer of 2003 resisting the U.S. led coalition. 
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(GOI), not officially established until June 2004, refers to coalition and 
government activities as GOI/US throughout, regardless. These generalizations, 
although important to identify, neither detract from nor reinforce the methodology 
utilized. Nevertheless, as to not dilute the product’s content, they are essential.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Timeline: 2003–2008 
B.  TIMEFRAME: 2003–2006 
1.  Repression Typology 
The Anbar Province is approximately a third of Iraq’s territory, but is home 
to only 1.3 million52 of Iraq’s 25 million inhabitants (Phillips, 2008, p. 8). Following 
the loss of military capability in the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam treated security in 
the Anbar Province as an economy of force operation. “Saddam made a virtue of 
necessity during the 1990’s, endorsing a strategy of ‘auxiliary tribalism’ (Long, 
2008, p. 75) that charged Anbar’s sheikhs with responsibility for enforcing order 
                                            
52 The vast majority of the 1.3 inhabitants of the Al Anbar Province are Sunni Arab Muslims. 
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throughout the province” (Phillips, 2008, p. 9). During the post Gulf War period up 
through Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam altered his defense strategy knowing 
that he could not defeat a U.S. led coalition on the conventional battlefield. “To 
deal with the ground threat [of an impending U.S. lead invasion], Saddam 
intended to orchestrate a conventional defense, supported by irregular forces 
(both paramilitary militias and large numbers of foreign jihadist who entered the 
country with the official encouragement before the war)” (Eisenstadt & White, 
2005, p. 2). These actions along with deBaa’thification and disbanding of the 
Iraqi army gave birth to the Sunni insurgency.  
“Insurgencies are based on the struggle to control, or win over, the ‘hearts 
and minds’ of the society’s civilian populace” (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 22). 
Following defeat of the Saddam Regime, the U.S. began the reconstruction 
efforts to create a new Iraqi government. A prerequisite to standing up a viable 
and legitimate government is to maintain population control in the absence of 
comparable security forces. “At the same time, Iraqi Salafist began to mobilize 
openly, participating in the insurgency from its earliest stages” (Phillips, 2008, p. 
6). “As 2003 progressed, however, the ineffective conventional resistance gave 
way to a much more dangerous insurgency and an incipient terrorist resistance 
to the U.S. occupation” (Searle, 2008, p. 63). The results are two parties vying for 
legitimacy, influence, and control over the population. The lens of repression53 
strategies captures how.  
In 2003, “the first serious demonstrations against the occupation occurred 
in Fallujah, where several demonstrators were shot dead by U.S. forces, an 
event that deepened the animosity of the local population toward the American 
occupation” (Abedin, 2005, p. 2). From February–March 2004, the 2nd MARDIV 
assumed responsibility for the security of Anbar from the 82nd Airborne Division. 
The Marines planned to have a much more population centric operational 
                                            
53 Repression is “any actions taken by [government or insurgency] to impede mobilization, 
harass and intimidate activists, divide organizations, and physically, arrest, imprison, and/or kill 
[adversaries]” (Stockdill, 1996; Earl, 2003, p. 45). The definition captures that both sides have the 
same options to influence the population and that the contest is population centric.  
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concept than the 82nd Airborne Division. They hoped to revive a strategy from 
Vietnam—“to have as much contact with the population as possible, to build up 
rapport and separate the guerillas from the civilian population that gave them 
cover” (Negus, 2004). However, as their losses to insurgent fighters rapidly 
increased, the Marines increasingly failed to discriminate between the population 
and the enemy. This timeframe characterizes GOI/US operations that relied 
heavily on the coercive tactics of raids, cordon and searches, and population 
control measures targeting insurgents, high level Former Regime Elements 
(FRE), foreign fighters, and their sympathizers. A young soldier, understanding 
the counterproductive nature of the coercion, said, “Every time we raid one of 
their houses, we make a new enemy. Every time we raid a wedding we make 
dozens” (Negus, 2004). To operationalize at the strategic level, an understanding 
at the tactical level proved to take years.  
The GOI/US large-scale Euphrates River Valley campaign54 conducted in 
the fall 2005 to deny AQI sanctuary and safe-haven from Ramadi to Al Qaim, 
exemplify coercive heavy population control tactics. The conduct of these 
operations was largely indiscriminant based to single sourced, often unreliable 
information provided by local Iraqis with unknown allegiance. When information 
was unavailable through informant networks, GOI/US security forces conducted 
random cordon and search operations in problem areas based on analysis of 
insurgent activity.55 The GOI/US operations resulted in numerous arrests, 
detentions, and collateral damage routinely based on little to no burden of proof.  
At the same time, the GOI/US conducted limited channeling activities; 
typically, the activities were reactive in response to collateral damage, as the 
                                            
54 The campaign includes Operations Matador, Rivergate, and Steal Curtain (Long, 2008, p. 
78). 
55 The GOI/US lacked the tactical intelligence-providing infrastructure needed to discriminate 
the insurgent from the population. This is captured in the 2006 U.S. Army COIN manual, “without 
good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen 
opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm” (2006, p. 1-23). Additionally, the COIN manual 
states, “A cycle develops where operations produce intelligence that drives subsequent 
operations” (2006, p. 1-23). The latter characterizes the GOI/US effort to overcome the 
intelligence delta. 
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security situation did not allow for more proactive civil military operations. The 
U.S. tried to channel the fighters away from AQI as it withdrew from Fallujah by 
creating the “Fallujah Brigade, a unit recruited from the surrounding area and 
commanded by a former Republican Guard general [Mohammed Latif]” (Negus, 
2004). This was a failed attempt at channeling and not only did the Fallujah 
brigade fail to fight AQI, they actually joined AQI as an organized group. Civilian 
military operation centers (CMOC) conducted the majority of the civil military 
operations (CMO) as opposed to interacting with the population in their own 
environment. The CMO process for injecting resources into the community, 
riddled with bureaucratic red tape, failed to meet the population’s necessities and 
quality of life. 
By contrast, the predominance of AQI’s population control was in the 
channeling realm. “Foreign jihadist provided local insurgents with valuable 
connections to sources of financial support throughout the Muslim world” 
(Phillips, 2008, p. 10). Central to the AQI strategy was to channel the tribal 
support to their movement. Capitalizing on the tribe’s conservative religious view 
and distrust of a central government, AQI formed an alliance stemming from their 
common interest in expelling the Coalition from Iraq and arresting the Shiites 
political ascendancy (Phillips, 2008, p. 9). AQI identified GOI/US informant 
networks and responded with coercive tactics to include harassment, torture, and 
death. AQI targeted members of the Iraqi security forces and their families 
consisting of local native Sunnis. AQI and the tribal population were waging an 
insurgent campaign against the GOI/US; therefore, any action against security 
forces carried the perception of justice and legitimacy. Additionally, they used 
death threats and harassment to maintain control of the population.  
2.  Mechanisms and Process 
The mechanisms and processes modulate the effects of repression tactics 
to establish an alliance between the population and AQI. The analysis begins by 
constructing the social environment that affect potential insurgents. AQI emerged 
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from a composite insurgency that included “former regime members, foreign 
jihadist, angry or aggrieved Iraqis, tribal groups, and criminals, who drew 
considerable strength from political and religious ideologies, tribal notions of 
honor and revenge, and shared solidarities deeply ingrained in the Sunni 
Triangle” (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 3). Many of these insurgents were former 
Baath Party members and Iraqi army soldiers who were unemployed due to the 
deBaa’thification policies of the GOI/US. “Situational factors-social pressure, 
family or tribal ties, coercion, and material incentives-are often of decisive 
importance” (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 10) explaining why people participate 
in insurgent related activities. Captured insurgent fighters listed their motives as 
“tribal or personal vengeance for a dead relative, or a destroyed house or poor 
treatment during a raid” (Negus, 2004). Additionally, AQI drew support from a 
large pool of unemployed workers in Anbar, estimated as high as 70 percent as 
of 2005 (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 14). Having defined the population’s social 
environment, the repression tactics are now applied to explain increases and 
decreases of incentives to participate in insurgent activity.  
How the tribes react to the population control measures is subject to 
perceptions of the individual and their social environment. The population 
perceived GOI/US coercive repression strategy illegitimate. The exact numbers 
exposed to perceived illegitimate repression is unknown. As of July 9, 2004, 
“22,000 security detainees had passed through U.S.-run prisons” (Negus, 2004). 
Most detentions lacked solid evidence of insurgent activity and resulted in 
months of detention. During their incarceration, the detainees endured perceived 
injustices and networked with likeminded individuals. The result of this 
experience was an insurgent, who had expanded his network of associates 
returned to the battlefield with the incentive to fight GOI/US forces. Compounding 
the problem was the GOI/US de-Baa’thification of the Iraq government after the 
defeat of the Sadaam regime.56 “The sweeping implementation of de-
                                            
56 De-Baa’thification was the missed opportunity for the GOI/US to channel the former 
regime security apparatus into the newly formed Iraqi government. 
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Baa’thification policy and the decision to dismantle the Iraqi Army deprived more 
than 400,000 Iraqis, many of them Sunni Arabs, of their livelihoods almost 
overnight” (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 3). Persons who directly, as opposed to 
indirectly, experience perceived illegitimate repression are much more likely to 
respond to positive sanctions from their social environment to participate in 
insurgent activities.  
Further enhancing the tribe’s incentives to protest is AQI’s channeling 
repression strategy that decreases the negative sanctions from supporting 
insurgent activity. The result of GOI/US and AQI tactics to control the tribal 
population is a larger pool of potential supporters for the insurgency. Eisenstadt 
and White capture the repression nexus created by suggesting the increasing 
amount of popular support the insurgents enjoy is a result of the effectiveness of 
their recruitment and mobilization efforts, their capacity for action, and the 
efficacy of the government countermeasures (2005, p. 7). This accounts for the 
individual tribal member’s meso-level mobilization into insurgent supporting 
groups by increasing the moral and public goods incentives to act on behalf of 
the insurgency.57 To illustrate the level of AQI support, in 2006, Anbar was 
responsible for 31.9% of significant actions (SIGACTs) in Iraq, Figure 5.58 
 
                                            
57 Being subjected to perceived illegitimate repression alone does not account for tribal 
support for the insurgency. When combined with the positive and negative sanctions of a larger 
social environment you move from being micro to meso-level mobilized. 
58 The 31.9% refers to normalized SIGACT data. The data is normalized by taking the total 
number of SIGACTs for the province in a year, divided by the provincial population, and 
multiplying by 100. For example, in 2006, Anbar had 13,902 (W. Marm, personal communication, 
September 11, 2009) SIGACTs, divided by a population of 1,280,000 (Iraq, 2009), and multiplying 
by 100 equaling 31.9%. The question of how much of the SIGACTs a particular population is 




Figure 5.   Anbar and Baghdad SIGACTs Normalized by Year 
AQI and Sunni insurgents swim in a large sympathetic sea in Anbar. This 
is captured by Eisenstadt and Whites’ reference to three separate opinion 
surveys taken in 2004–2005 by Iraqi and foreign pollsters show that between 45 
percent and 85 percent of respondents in Sunni areas express support for 
insurgent attacks on U.S. forces (2005, p. 9). The normalized SIGACT data in 
Figure 5, illustrates Anbar disproportionately represented in comparison to 
Baghdad and the country as a whole. Examples of perceived illegitimate GOI/US 
repression include the following: in the early phases of occupation, tens of 
thousands of innocent Iraqis were wrongly detained, lost a family member, were 
humiliated or treated roughly at the hands of the coalition or Iraqi government 
forces (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 10). Zarqawi provided additional examples, 
in a September 14, 2005 communiqué, detailing illegitimate GOI/US activities 
that included indiscriminate bombing, abuse of detainees, mistreatment of 
women, and support of Shia militias targeting the Sunni population (Special 
Dispatch 987, 2005). The illegitimate repression and the deBaa’thification 
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process created additional system alienation with the GOI/US. The interaction of 
AQI and GOI/US repression tactics resulted in an incentive structure in favor of 
AQI.  
The mobilizing structures provide for the analysis of the organizational 
capacity of AQI and its effect on the population’s incentive structures. Below are 
categorizations of the mobilizing structures of AQI and tribe. 
 
 
Table 5.   Mobilizing Structures 
The tribes socially embed into the fabric of the population in Anbar. AQI 
embeds into the tribal population due to aligning against a common threat.  
They [AQI] have established a significant presence in many broad 
sectors of Sunni Arab society, including social, economic, religious, 
and criminal spheres. Its ranks include members of the former 
regime’s intelligence and security services, former Baa’thist59  Iraqi 
and foreign jihadist, and tribal figures, and it reportedly provides 
resources and direction to many insurgent groups. Personal, family, 
tribal, and religious ties are believed to facilitate cooperation and 
coordination among insurgent leaders. The connective structures of 
both the tribes and AQI are web-like, linked by personal, tribal, and 
organizational ties (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, pp. 14, 22).  
With the alignment came access to the tribal infrastructure. The same 
smuggling and black market the tribes had relied on to survive were now bringing 
foreign fighters and weapons into Iraq (Searle, 2008, p. 63). Social 
embeddedness in the tribes strengthens the moral and public goods incentives 
                                            
59 Al Anbar has “historically provided many of the most competent officers in the Iraq military 
and security forces” (Abedin, 2005, p. 2). 
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and accounts for meso-level mobilization. The informal leadership, in both the 
tribes and AQI, increase the incentives to protest based on the requirement to 
maintain the trust and solidarity of their constituents. The net result of merging 
AQI and the tribe’s mobilizing structures is depth of social control and increased 
mobilization through positive incentives subject to the groups maintaining frame 
alignment. 
Analyzing the architecture of power provides a comparable discussion of 
the GOI/US organizational capacity. “In the operational design for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom; U.S. commanders and policy makers opted for a small, rapid force, 
which skirted Iraq’s major population centers and employed overwhelming 
precision fires to execute a ‘long-distance coup d’état’ and bring about the rapid 
collapse of the regime” (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 2). In the Anbar Province, 
the U.S. led coalition lacked both the depth and breadth needed to maintain 
control in the absence of government security forces. On June 28, 2004, when 
the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) handed over sovereignty to the Interim 
Iraqi government, AQI controlled Fallujah and maintained an open presence in 
many other Iraqi towns to include the provincial capital of Ramadi (Negus, 2004). 
As of July 15, 2005, “many villages and outpost in the province [Anbar] are under 
effective insurgent control and this is clearly boosting the organizational 
capabilities of the rebels” (Abedin, 2005, p. 2). AQI was the de facto law and 
government in Anbar. 
The GOI/US controlled small pockets of territory in time and space. To 
overcome the lack of breadth, the GOI/US employed a strategy of massing 
security forces to clear problem areas and subsequently withdrawing. While 
occupying the problem areas, the security forces utilized coercive heavy tactics 
as an only option due to lack of depth needed to identify the insurgent networks. 





serves to strengthen the incentive structures in favor of AQI. The following 
figure60 is an estimate of AQI’s and GOI/US’s organizational capacity in Anbar at 
the end of time period one.  
 
Figure 6.   Organizational Capacity (Timeframe One) 
The timeframe of 2003 to 2006 includes four transformative events: the fall 
of the regime and subsequent deBaa’thification, which included dismantling of 
security forces in the spring of 2003; the killing of four U.S. contractors in 
Fallujah, March 31, 2004; the breaking story of alleged torture and abuse of 
detainees in Abu Gharib, spring 2004; and the founding of AQI and pledging 
allegiance to Osama Bin Laden in October 2004. The fall of the regime resulted  
 
 
                                            
60 As means of controlling the population, the organizational capacity highlights the limit of 
options (tactics) available. Therefore, the organization capacity depicts the likely repression 
tactics used to control the population. 
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in a disenfranchised Sunni population that gave rise to an insurgency that 
subsequently aligned with AQI. AQI provided the Sunni population with a chance 
to return to the status quo, or at a minimum, a degree of self-determination. 
The killing of U.S. contractors in Fallujah and hanging their charred bodies 
from the bridge led to the initial invasion of Fallujah in April 2004.61 This led to a 
GOI/US population control strategy that became increasingly coercive. The 
GOI/US stopped short of their objectives of clearing the city of insurgents and 
what remained was a moral victory for the insurgents. The insurgents were 
emboldened and cognitively liberated, believing that the defeat of the GOI/US 
was possible. Near simultaneously, the scandal of Abu Ghraib broke, which 
detailed the widespread abuses of Iraqi detainees. The intense Arab media 
coverage of these events created a public outcry throughout the Sunni Arab 
world. These events led to dramatic increases in insurgent activity and forced the 
GOI/US to conduct a second siege of Fallujah in November 2004.  
The transformative events and the backfire from the attempted cover-up of 
Abu Ghraib led to a dramatic increase in mobilization for the insurgency. The 
founding of AQI and pledging allegiance to Osama Bin Laden allowed Sunni 
insurgent organizations to align under the injustice frame. The effects on the 
incentive structures dramatically increased mobilization. The severe damage 
caused to GOI/US legitimacy negated the need for social incentives, and 
dramatically increased the moral and public goods incentives to oppose the 
GOI/US. The Sunni population universally understood what was the problem, 
who was to blame, the solution and the need for action. 
3.  Population Alignment 
The repression tactics that represent the independent variable (IV) have 
been characterized. The interaction of repression tactics, affected by the  
 
                                            
61 The media coverage of the Blackwater contractor’s incident led to public outcry for action 
in the U.S. 
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mechanisms and processes, create a spatial relationship between the GOI/US, 
AQI, and the population. The outcome of GOI/US coercion and AQI channeling is 
the population aligning with AQI.  
The highlighted column of Table 6 corresponds to the strategic interaction 
model in cell two. Cell two of the strategic interaction model depicts the 
population more closely aligned with AQI based on the common threat caused by 
the coercive GOI/US strategy.  
 
 





Figure 7.    Strategic Interaction Model: Timeframe One (McCormick, 2008).62 
C.  TRANSITIONAL TIMEFRAME 
1.  Repression Typology 
“In 2004, the mainstream Anbar tribes were sitting on the fence or leaning 
toward the insurgents and terrorists” (Searle, 2008, p. 63). However, the tribes 
were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. “Al Qaeda had 
initially presented itself as a complimentary power but eventually become a 
competing and then dominant power” (McCary, 2009, p. 50). AQI and the tribes 
aligned to fight a common threat, not necessarily, because the tribes shared or 
approved of the inappropriate means AQI used to achieve their utopian goals.  
To maintain this alignment, AQI required the popular support of its 
constituency. However, “Al Qaeda was taking over “all forms of power in the 
region, from violence to politics to finance-all at the expense of tribal leaders” 
(McCary, 2009, p. 48). AQI’s manipulation of the tribes (subverting the tribal 
leaders and tribal customs) was weakening the alliance and motivating the tribal 
                                            
62 The strategic interaction model depicts a constant state given a particular time and space; 
however, the spatial relationship is modulated by the mechanisms and processes enhancing or 
mitigating the effects of the interacting repression strategies. For example, the transformative 
events explained during this timeframe increased the distance between the population and 
GOI/US, while at the same time, decreased the distance between the population and AQI. 
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leaders to look for alternatives. “An unnamed Sunni leader complained that ‘the 
resistance group had two options: either fight AQI and negotiate with the 
Americans or fight the Americans and join the Islamic State of Iraq [AQI]” (Simon, 
2008). The tribes had a long history of resisting any form of central control that 
was inconsistent with tribal norms and values.  
“Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar deemed al Qaeda’s influence as more of a 
threat to their continued rule, while U.S. forces were considered to be less and 
less of a determining factor in the region” (McCary, 2009, p. 44). In 2005, the 
fissures led to violence as the Albu Mahal tribe began to fight the AQI 
“occupation” around the town of Al Qaim. However, in May of 2005, the GOI/US 
failed to capitalize on an opportunity to support the initial tribes to revolt against 
AQI. Later, a larger tribal alliance of the Albu Nimr and the Albu Mahal tribes 
formed the Hamza Forces to fight AQI from Hit to Al Qaim along the Euphrates 
River Valley (ERV). “Fasal al-Gaoud, a former governor of Anbar and sheikh of 
the Albu Nimr, contacted U.S. Marines for support.63 The Marines had already 
been planning an offensive around al Qaim, so this could have been an ideal 
moment to cement an alliance. Instead, the Marine offensive, known as 
Operation Matador, was uncoordinated with the tribes and made use of intensive 
firepower, which alienated many tribesmen by destroying portions of Al Qaim” 
(Long, 2008, p. 78). This was a failed GOI/US opportunity to forge a relationship 
with tribes in Anbar and to channel support away from AQI. 
In 2006, the GOI/US jettisoned their coercive tactics targeting the Sunni 
insurgency in Anbar in favor of a population centric strategy.64 It is arguable that 
the change in strategy was a result of analysis and understanding of the nature 
of the AQI/population alignment or a last resort. Either way, the results were 
dramatic and surprised even the naysayers predicting a Vietnam like end to the 
                                            
63 As early as 2005, it was a known fact that U.S. authorities were holding talks with 
representatives of the insurgents, which was later confirmed by Donald Rumsfeld (Abedin, 2005, 
p. 3). 
64 “These efforts require trust and willingness to place trust on locals, as well as the 
confidence to empower and enable local leaders” (McCary, 2009, p. 55). 
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war. The change of tactics included not only the ‘what’, but the ‘how’ and built off 
a grass-root effort that began in 2004. The channeling strategy had two parts: (1) 
provide resources to the tribes through tribal leaders and (2) develop tribal 
paramilitary forces to secure the population.  
In 2004, SOF (Special Operations Forces) teams operating in the Anbar 
province began to engage tribal leaders on security issues. SOF teams 
“approached lower-level tribal sub-sheikhs and found out what they needed in 
terms of civil affairs (CA) projects” (Searle, 2008, p. 63). The focus on sub-sheikh 
came from an understanding of how influence flows through the tribe.65 At the 
sub-sheikh or clan level, leadership begins to centralize. The conditions were 
ideal as the sub-sheikhs were seeing their authority undermined by the efforts of 
AQI. The CA “projects increased the prestige and authority of the sub-sheikhs, 
thereby undermining the sheikhs above them” (Searle, 2008, p. 63). While true, it 
had even a greater effect by increasing the sub-sheikhs ‘wasta’ within his tribe 
and among other tribes.66 “Empowering the sheikhs had a substantial benefit of 
reinforcing both the sheikh’s authority and the indigenous Iraqi social structures 
that could be maintained indefinitely”67 (Searle, 2008, p. 64). However, this 
required the tribal leaders to operate within the goals and objectives of the 
GOI/US. “Any tribal leader who tolerated insurgent activity was brought into line 
by denying his tribe access to the economic benefits of supporting the coalition” 
(Searle, 2008, p. 63). Tribal engagement was slow to produce tangible results 
and met with varying degrees of skepticism within the GOI/US, but by 2006, was 
becoming increasingly apparent as the tribes formed the Anbar Awakening in 
opposition to AQI. 
                                            
65 Clan, or fakhd (pl. afkhdh). The fakhd is the third level of tribal structure. Each of which has 
its own chief and its own name and specific territory generally corresponding to a village and 
serves as the basic units in productive terms; they organize pastures, own sources of water and 
have a strong sense of territoriality (Todd, 2006, p. 2–43).  
66 Wasta in Arabic roughly means "connections" or influence, and is arguably the most 
valuable form of currency in much of the Middle East, far more effective than bribes and certainly 
more effective than following due process (The Wonders of Wasta, 2009). 
67 “Each tribe is headed by a sheikh, whose legitimacy is based on his ability to provide for 
his people, which engenders patronage to his will” (McCary, 2009, pp. 45–46). 
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The strategy shift to channeling was resulting in small incremental shifts of 
tribal allegiance from AQI to paramilitary security forces under the auspices of 
GOI/US. Any element that changed allegiance from AQI to GOI/US would be 
subject to the coercive forces of AQI, and therefore, required security assistance. 
“The commanders helped tribal leaders regain their ability to provide their 
population with security by strengthening preexisting, traditional means of power 
sharing and fiscal distribution by reintroducing tribal ordering” (McCary, 2009, p. 
54). One of the first recognized paramilitary forces developed by GOI/US was the 
Desert Protectors tasked with providing security in the vast expanses of western 
Anbar (Searle, 2008, pp. 64–65).68 Later, in November 2005, GOI/US forces 
launched Operation Steel Curtain, a second attempt to deny AQI safe haven and 
sanctuary in the Al Qaim area. The GOI/US, having failed to support the Hamza 
forces earlier, coordinated and cooperated with the Albu Mahal leaving stay 
behind forces at the conclusion of the operation to support the Albu Mahal tribes 
in the fight against AQI (Long, 2008, p. 78). This was the first successful large-
scale coalition of tribes and GOI/US forces operating against AQI. 
“However, many in the [GOI/US] remained reluctant to fully embrace a 
tribal strategy. More importantly, tribal leaders were targeted by al-Qaeda in a 
coercive campaign of murder and intimidation, which sapped many tribes of the 
will to fight” (Long, 2008, p. 79). The change would come from a realization that 
the current GOI/US strategy was not working and the tribes consolidating in 
                                            
68 Many other examples exist. Although designed to provide security, one day they were low-
level AQI operatives and the next channeled away to tribal security forces. “In July 2006, SOF 
and the 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment, combined to carry out the first successful police 
recruiting drive in the Anbar city of Hit; 150 tribesman joined the local force as a result” (Searle, 
2008, p. 65). In the summer of 2007, “the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, 
worked with a 2,300 man Sunni unit, dubbed the Volunteers, to patrol a sector of Anbar between 
Baghdad and Fallujah” (Searle, 2008, p. 66). 
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opposition to AQI.69 “The U.S. would work to exploit a grass-roots anti-al Qaeda 
movement already underway by taking pressure off the insurgents who had 
begun to point their weapons at the jihadists and funneling money to tribal 
leaders. In theory, this would help dismantle the jihadist infrastructure and create 
islands of stability that would eventually join like ‘oil spots” (Simon, 2008). In 
effect, the change of strategy became less about defeating AQI than winning the 
influence of the population. A byproduct of the winning the population would be 
defeating AQI, now absent of the human and geographic terrain needed to thrive. 
Trial runs and localized successes at tribal engagement would become an 
overarching strategy to defeat AQI. “Bush observed in his January surge speech 
that Sunnis were challenging al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq, and a February 2007 
National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq recommended ‘deputizing, resourcing, and 
working more directly with neighborhood watch groups and establishing 
grievance committees–to help mend frayed relationships between tribal and 
religious groups, which have mobilized into community warfare over the past 
three years” (Simon, 2008). This announcement preceded an influx of resources 
into the tribal system.  
“The Army commander for Ramadi, Col Sean McFarland, essentially 
offered to ‘deputize’ a sheikh’s militia, allowing police recruits to guard their own 
neighborhoods, an approach previously expressly forbidden by U.S. policy” 
(McCary, 2009, p. 49). From February 2007 to February 2008, “over 220 million 
has been funneled through Ramadi’s sheikhs”70 (Katulis, Juul, & Moss, 2008, p. 
                                            
69 In February 2007, the United States strategy took into account these realities. “Whereas 
the United States had intermittingly engaged with the tribal leaders in Anbar from 2004 onwards 
in its efforts to stabilize the security situation, the possibility of forming a de facto alliance with the 
tribes emerged only once the Sunnis had themselves become disenchanted with AQI, and once 
the United States had grown equally disillusioned with the prospects of achieving a ‘top down’ 
process of political reconciliation through the auspices of the Al Maliki government” (Simon 2008, 
Phillips, 2008, p. 13). 
70 “The deals were mediated by tribal leaders and consisted of payments of $360 per month 
per combatant in exchange for allegiance and cooperation.” (Simon, 2008) “By paying the 
sheikhs directly and allowing them to distribute the money as they saw fit, tribal leaders were able 
to regain their legitimacy and demand the loyalty of their tribesmen as they had done in the past” 
(McCary, 2009, p. 50). 
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5). The GOI/US also changed how their forces were employed; shifting away 
from secure bases and “fanning out to small outpost in populated areas, where 
they maintained a presence and backed up the local police” (Searle, 2008, p. 
65). These actions channeled the population away from AQI while providing the 
necessary protection from AQI retribution. In sum, “the U.S. military almost 
completely changed its reconstruction and security policy in the province, 
sending money through Sunni tribal sheikhs instead of contract bids or the 
central government. Most significantly, the U.S. authorized, funded, and armed 
Sunni militias, which co-opted al Qaeda and insurgent recruiting and provided 
local security” (McCary, 2009, p. 45). The GOI/US channeling efforts were 
providing the tribes with a viable alternative to supporting AQI. 
By the end of 2004, Abu Musab Al Zaraqi’s Tawid Al Jihad71 network had 
asserted itself as the Sunni insurgent group most capable of organizing and 
leading resistance to the GOI/US. As AQI “gained strength, it imposed its will on 
the local community” (Searle, 2008, p. 65). AQI’s Islamist ideology, characterized 
by its monoism, collectivism, utopianism, and hyper-moralist vision of society, put 
them at odds with the pragmatic Anbar tribes. AQI’s foreign jihadist taking wives 
from the tribe, disrespect for the sheikhs, and the intimidation and murders for 
nonconformity was becoming a greater factor in the alliance than the threat 
posed by the GOI/US. 
AQI used violence against any target that posed a threat to its existence in 
Anbar and they had a clear strategy in support of their vision.72 
The Sunni insurgents conduct purposeful activities; they do not 
attack randomly. Their counter-collaboration line of operation (LOO) 
“attacks ISF and Iraqi government personnel and facilities, 
translators working for the coalition forces or personnel, and 
tipsters. Their counter-stability LOO attacks civilians, religious sites, 
independent tribal or community leaders, foreign diplomats, and 
                                            
71 The predecessor to Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR), which would later become 
Al Qaeda in Iraq after Abu Musab, Al Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. 
72 These targets included the tribes that had received schools, medical clinics, and other 
infrastructure development projects from the GOI/US to improve the quality of life for the tribes. 
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international and nongovernmental organizations. Another LOO, 
counter-election, was implemented prior to the January 2005 
elections, and consists of attacks against voters, election officials, 
and candidates. (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, pp. 19–20) 
These actions send a message to the tribes and the Sunni population that 
collaboration is not tolerated. For supporters of the resistance, the coercive 
nature of AQI repression was at least tolerable if not legitimate. These tactics 
were also very effective means of controlling the population. “The insurgent 
campaign against ‘collaborators’, including ISF recruits and members (and 
families), has been highly successful, with insurgents killing high numbers of 
Iraqis working for the government or connected to the reconstruction effort and 
intimidating many more” (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 20). The success came at 
the price of alienating the population to AQI, which would eventually lead to their 
demise.73 
“The Iraqi Sunnis’ enthusiasm for the alliance waned as AQI increasingly 
attempted to assert its leadership” (Simon, 2008). Specifically, AQI alienated 
tribes by attempting to control the daily aspects of life. “Al Qaeda operatives 
regularly meted out brutal punishments for seemingly trivial social transgressions 
such as smoking cigarettes or watching satellite television” (International Group 
2008; Paley, 2008; Phillips, 2008, p. 17). These types of actions combined with 
AQI’s coercive channeling of resources away from the tribe was developing rifts 
that risked AQI remaining aligned with the tribes. 
Al Qaeda mounted a campaign of deadly intimidations, and slowly 
but surely began taking control of money-making activities 
traditionally held by tribes. To force sheikhs and tribal leaders in 
Iraq to cede financial or tactical control, al Qaeda mounted a violent 
campaign of gruesome, demonstrative intimidation: kidnapping, 
assassinations, torture, and grotesque murders of tribal leaders and 
their family members, including beheading and public 
dismemberment. (McCary, 2009, p. 47) 
                                            
73 AQI had overestimated their influence over the tribes and their tactics resulted in 
degradation of depth in social control. 
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One of the tribes most affected was the Albu Risha tribe. They had “lost 
control over portions of the road from Baghdad to Amman, undermining its ability 
to raise revenue by taxing or extorting traders or travelers. When the Albu 
Rishas’ leaders protested, Sheikh Bazi al Rishawi, was killed along with one of 
his sons, and two more of his sons were abducted” (Simon, 2008). Throughout 
2005, the rift turned into a split within the insurgency between Anbar’s tribal 
leadership and AQI. This was apparent as the Albu Mahal, Albu Fahd, and Albu 
Risha tribes resisted AQI control (Long, 2008, p. 78; Simon, 2008). Throughout 
2004 and 2005, AQI was successful at coercing the tribal leadership back into 
their control. However, under AQI control, support was often passive and the 
discontent with AQI would continue to build. The tribal leaders would now actively 
seek viable options to AQI control in Anbar and the December 2005 elections 
would provide them with an alternative political order. 
“In December 2005 Sheikh Nasr, head of the Albu Fahd tribe was 
assassinated. He was abducted and murdered by AQI operatives a day after 
meeting with U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and other tribal leaders, who 
gathered to discuss ways to reduce violence in Anbar” (McCary, 2009, p. 47). 
With the rift growing larger, AQI identified the December 2005 elections as a 
threat to their control over the Anbar tribal population. Days before the December 
2005 elections, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi warned its supporters “the Crusaders are 
preparing for the new ‘Dayton’ conspiracy by forming an alliance with the fools 
amongst Sunnis. Additionally, Zarqawi threatened to “massacre any Sunni or 
Shiites who dared to vote in the democratic elections”74 (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 2). 
                                            
74 These threats build off previous communiqués from Bin Laden and Zarqawi urging the 
Iraqi population not to support the Iraqi Elections. On December 27, 2004, Bin Laden was quoted 
as saying, “Muslims must beware of these kinds of elections. They must unite around the Jihad 
warriors and those who resist the occupiers." He continued, "Anyone who participates in these 
elections … has committed apostasy against Allah.” Bin Laden explained that participation in 
these elections is apostasy because the Iraqi constitution is "a Jahiliyya constitution that is made 
by man" and because "the elections are ordered by America, under their airplanes, bombs, and 
tanks” (Special Dispatch 837, 2004). On January 26, 2005, Zarqawi followed with another 
warning. "Take care not to go near the centers of heresy and abomination, that is, the election 
[booths.] He who has warned has carried out his duty; [if something happens] do not blame us, 
but yourselves” (Special Dispatch 987, 2005). 
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AQI was increasing their rhetoric and actions against challenges to their power 
base. Targeting the elections was not necessarily a mistake for AQI, but creating 
the conditions where the tribes were in support of the elections was a strategic 
miscalculation. Targeting the tribal leaders’ acts of defiance served to increase 
the distance between the tribes and AQI while creating an opportunity for 
GOI/US channeling efforts. 
The shift in alignment from AQI to the GOI/US came in two phases. First, 
the tribal leaders broke the alliance with AQI while many tribal members 
remained. This resulted in AQI violently repressing the tribal leaders. Second, 
once the tribal leaders received GOI/US support and were able to compete with 
AQI, the tribal members chose their tribes over AQI and coercion was a factor in 
the tribal members aligning with the tribal leaders. Sheikh Abdul Sattar, whose 
father Shiekh Rishawi’s was killed by AQI, assembled a small group of tribal 
figures (with the help of funds from the local U.S. military commander) under the 
banner of the Anbar Salvation Council to roll back Al Qaeda’s influence” (Simon, 
2008). The threat posed by AQI was aligning the tribes in support GOI/US and 
AQI responded with even more coercion, to include many spectacular 
assassinations. This included the assassination of prominent Awakening 
members Fasl Al Gaoud, the former governor of Ramadi, in a hotel suicide 
bombing on June 25, 2007, and Abd al Sattar, who had met President Bush two 
weeks earlier, on September, 13, 2007 (McCary, 2009, p. 49). However, the 
coercion and corresponding message was failing to control the perceptions and 
behavior of the tribes.  
By late 2007, it was clear that AQI had overplayed its hand while coercing 
the tribes that constituted the backbone of the insurgency since its inception in 
2003. AQ central had identified the futility of such a strategy well before the death 
of AQI leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. “The alliance between Al Qaeda and 
Zarqawi was plagued by disagreements over strategy and tactics, with the former 
decrying Zarqawi for alienating Muslim public opinion through his routine resort to 
indiscriminate killing of Iraqi civilians” (Wright, 2005; Phillips, 2008, p. 7). “In the 
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end, AQI alienated many Sunni Arabs with attacks that killed numerous innocent 
civilians, and with the extreme version of Islam that they imposed in areas under 
their sway” (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 32). AQI and the tribes were united in 
opposition to the GOI/US, but in the end, AQI’s Islamist ideology was not 
compatible with the tribes desire to remain autonomous. 
2.  Mechanisms and Processes 
Not all coercive repression results in insurgent violence any more than all 
channeling reduces insurgent violence. However, analysis of repression by way 
of the mechanisms and processes accounts for the mobilization of the Sunni 
Anbar tribes in support of GOI/US. The tribes’ decision to move away from AQI 
and to align with the GOI/US was not a result of AQI’s coercive acts or the 
GOI/US channeling alone. It does account for some of the changes in AQI’s and 
the GOI/US’s architecture of power that changed the available options to control 
the population. The change was a result of the interaction of both sides’ tactics 
and transformative events that ultimately changed the incentive structures of the 
tribes to resist AQI. 
Former regime elements, foreign jihadist, angry or aggrieved Iraqis, tribal 
groups and criminal elements formed AQI (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 3) and it 
is arguable that no element was more important than the tribes were. AQI was 
able to form a composite Sunni insurgency because the incentives to protest 
heavily favored resistance to GOI/US in the wake of the 2003 invasion. Starting 
late in 2004 and gaining momentum throughout 2005, AQI’s coercive internal 
social control of the tribes pushed many tribal leaders and members away. By 
late 2005, the GOI/US bottom up approach to channeling through tribal leaders 
yielded tactical results and provided a viable option to rid Anbar of AQI. During 
the transition timeframe, AQI’s actions can be best characterized as coercion, 
while the GOI/US is channeling. 
The Anbar tribes’ social environment was changing because of the 
population control measures utilized by AQI and GOI/US. The quasi legitimacy 
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AQI enjoyed early in the insurgency resulted in the tribes responding favorably to 
the moral and public goods incentives to oppose the GOI/US. However, as AQI 
began to assert control over the daily aspects of life, which was inconsistent with 
tribal norms and values, the social environment changed. “By the beginning of 
2006, local opinion in Anbar was turning decisively against AQI75” (Phillips, 2008, 
p. 12). The incentives to conform to AQI’s vision of society lessened the effect of 
social incentives to support AQI, negating the moral and public good incentives 
to oppose the GOI/US. The tribal leaders, who lost their traditional role as 
leaders within their society, began to distance themselves from AQI. AQI 
responded with harsh coercion to conform.  
Tribal leaders were targeted by al-Qaeda in a coercive campaign of 
murder and intimidation, which sapped many tribes of the will to 
fight. The success of the terrorists in this campaign was due in part 
to the nature of tribal loyalty. Al-Qaeda was able to turn clans and 
families from the same tribe against one another with a combination 
of carrots (money and other patronage) and sticks (threats of 
assassination). This pattern of failed efforts to oppose al-Qaeda in 
Anbar continued into 2006. (Long, 2008, p. 79)  
The tribal leaders united in opposition to AQI to reverse the trend and the 
GOI/US capitalized on the opportunity to forge an alliance with the tribes. 
“Confronted with a brutal AQI occupation, the tribal sheikhs had ample 
reasons to look for alternatives. AQI had displaced the tribal leaders as the de 
facto power broker in the tribal areas. This combined with the trend of escalating 
violence76 in Anbar had the U.S. looking for an alternative strategy. By 2006, the 
U.S. and Iraqi government policy toward the tribes was more sympathetic” 
(Searle, 2008, p. 65). The GOI/US channeling efforts focused on sub-sheikh 
tribal leaders, increasing their ability to provide for their tribes. The tribal leaders 
were now able to compete with AQI for the allegiance of their members. When 
                                            
75 This assessment is supported by the backfire in the wake the bombing of the Al Askaria 
Mosque in Samarra viewed negatively by both Sunni and Shia populations (Ghosh, 2006). 
Additional support was the Albu Nimr and Albu Mahal tribes’ resistance to AQI in Western Anbar 
beginning in the summer of 2005 (Long, 2008, p. 78; Simon, 2008). 
76 In 2005 and 2006, Anbar was the most violent province in Iraq and the trend was 
worsening (W. Marm, personal communication, September 11, 2009). 
 53
forced to choose, [the] men followed their tribes” (McCary, 2009, p. 52). “For 
Sunni Muslims in Anbar, the strongest remaining form of identity was their tribe, 
which consist of various smaller clans that are in turned composed of extended 
families” (McCary, 2009, p. 45) with “more than 85% of Iraqis claim some form of 
tribal affiliation” (Kilcullen, 2008, p. 1). With support to tribes contingent upon 
supporting the GOI/US goals and objectives, the tribal leaders utilized positive 
and negative sanctions to bring tribal members into line.77  
“Once Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha decided to support the U.S. and the 
Iraqi government, he was tireless in promoting his new cause” (Searle, 2008, p. 
66). The result of the changing social environment led to a micro and meso-level 
mobilization away from AQI. With the tribal leaders legitimately controlling the 
social environment, the moral incentives increase in opposition to AQI. “As one 
sheikh put it, ‘We consider the Americans to be our friends at the moment so that 
we can get rid of the extremist” (McCary, 2009, p. 51). The tribes, threatened by 
AQI’s presence, are now sanctioning violent opposition to AQI; at the same time, 
the norms of violence and protest against the GOI/US is no longer justified. 
Additionally, the tribes are alienated with the political order AQI espouses and 
regard opposition as a public good. Killcullen captures that sentiment of the tribe 
in the quote of an unnamed Iraqi informant, 
Then AQI killed a tribal leader because of an argument over this 
[tribal leaders opposing AQI’s not recognizing tribal customs]. Then 
the tribes turned against them because they believed they were 
trying to rule over them and tell them what to do. AQI killed the 
sheikh’s sons, and killed other people and attacked the fuel 
smuggling the tribes used to make money. Then more and more 
leaders turned against the takfiryun and now the tribes were 
fighting AQI. (2008, p. 2) 
                                            
77 The GOI/US provided resources to the tribal leaders, which had the responsibility for their 
dispersion (Searle, 2008, p. 63). The resources provided the tribal leaders the wasta needed to 
control the tribal member’s behavior. If the tribal leaders failed to support the GOI/US objective, 
they risked exclusion from the GOI/US channeling efforts; losing their ability to influence their 
tribe. 
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AQI’s ability to utilize incentive structures to control behavior eroded; 
therefore, any AQI coercion further strengthens the tribe’s alliance with GOI/US. 
“AQI atrocities merely activated tribal revenge obligations, thereby fortifying 
rather than weakening the resolve of the AQI enemies” (Kilcullen, 2007; Phillips, 
2008). With the tribes aligned with GOI/US, coercion is a legitimate option to 
control insurgent behavior. With the social environment negatively sanctioning 
insurgent activity,78 visibility and information on insurgent networks increase, 
which allows for discriminate targeting of an increasing isolated AQI organization. 
Analysis of the mobilizing structures captures organizational capacity of 
AQI during the transition timeframe. Changes in the mobilizing structures 
influence the effect of interacting repression tactics on the population’s incentive 
structures. Table 7 contrasts the characterizations of AQI and the Anbar tribes 
during the two timeframes. 
 
 
Table 7.   Changes in the Mobilizing Structures 
                                            
78 This includes tribal members still operating in support of AQI. 
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“Despite the spectacular successes that had been attributed to AQI, it was 
the nationalist Sunnis who provided the backbone of the insurgency and had 
most of the killing and dying” (Simon, 2008). AQI was socially embedded to the 
degree the tribes aligned with them to fill their ranks with fighters and supporters. 
As the tribes united into larger groups opposing AQI, AQI became an isolated 
unsegmented group. As a homogeneous extremist group, AQI was no longer 
part of the tribes’ social environment; thereby, lessening their ability to 
manipulate incentive structures to control the population’s behavior. Although 
AQI remained reticulated, the loss of social embeddedness removed the 
connective structures required for meso-level mobilization and manipulation of 
the tribes. The centrality of AQI leadership changed as tribal opposition 
increased. The AQI centralization of leadership and organizational structure is a 
response to an organization in decay. The attempt to centralize control over the 
tribes further alienated the population, resulting in a public good incentive to 
mobilize in opposition to AQI. “Tribal leaders organize the local population 
according to its own priorities” (McCary, 2009, p. 46). The net result of changes 
in the mobilizing structures accounts for the demobilization of support for AQI 
and mobilizing in support for GOI/US.  
The tribes’ realignment had a dramatic effect on the GOI/US architecture 
of power in Anbar. It provided the GOI/US the much needed depth and breadth 
to defeat AQI in Anbar. As of 2005, U.S. government estimated that the Sunni 
insurgency consisted of 3,500 fighters, 10,000-20,000 active collaborators, and 
1,000 foreign jihadists (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 7). This conservative 
estimate illustrates how the size and scope of the problem dramatically changed 
when the 3,500 fighters and 10,000–20,000 active collaborators realign in 
support of the GOI/US. “By early 2008, over 90,000 predominately Sunni 
militiamen had been organized into ‘Sons of Iraq” groups tasked with the 
responsibility of fighting AQI, leaving the latter both outgunned and increasingly 
more estranged from local population” (Simon, 2008; Phillip, 2008, p. 3). The 
militias and a surge of 21,500 U.S. troops fanned out into small outposts in 
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support of their new allies to defeat AQI. The breadth provided the organizational 
capacity to provide security for the tribal population and defeat AQI, but the depth 
gain through the alliance that provided information needed to focus these 
forces.79 With the incentive structures supporting the tribal alliance against AQI, 
the sea was drained and AQI was denied the human to terrain to maneuver 
against the GOI/US. The following figure is an estimate of AQI’s and GOI/US’s 
organizational capacity in Anbar following the tribes shift in alliance. 
 
Figure 8.   Organizational Capacity (Transition Timeframe) 
The transition period included two transformative events that drastically 
affected the incentives to support AQI: the December 2005 election and the 
February 2006 bombing of Askariya Mosque. Prior to the December 2005 
                                            
79 “The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, worked with a 2,300-man 
Sunni unit, dubbed the volunteers, to patrol a sector of Anbar between Baghdad and Fallujah. 
According to the division commander, violence fell sharply in the area between April and July 
2007, and no attacks on U.S. forces occurred there for two months (Searle, 2008, p. 66).  
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elections, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi threatened violence against Iraqis who 
participated in the national elections (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 2). Failing to participate 
in previous elections had not benefited the Anbar tribes,80 and this combined with 
the political order AQI provided, led the tribes to search for alternatives. AQI 
understood the threat that the political process posed to their coexistence with 
the tribes. Zarqawi threatened to “massacre any Sunni or Shiites who dared to 
vote in the democratic elections” (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 3). AQI spiked sectarian 
violence in September 2005 in an attempt to disrupt the December elections 
(Hafez, 2006, p. 605). Despite AQI’s attempt to derail the election process, “the 
December 2005 round of national elections went ahead peacefully and with the 
participation of large numbers of both Sunnis81 and Shiites” (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 
3). This resulted in AQI broadening the scope of their operations from targeting 
just GOI/US security forces, to targeting the civilian population (Sunni and Shiite) 
and security forces.  
Following the 2005 election, AQI viewed civilians as legitimate, vulnerable, 
and useful targets (Eisenstadt & White, 2005, p. 20). From December 2005 to 
January 2006, the number of persons killed by suicide bombing increased 244% 
(Hafez, 2006, p. 606). Previously, when AQI targeted the GOI/US security forces, 
the population perceived this as legitimate and defensive action. However, when 
this tactic failed to achieve the desired results (derail the political process), AQI 
made terrorism their predominant tactic.82 AQI selected targets based on their 
symbolic or representative value, as a means of instilling anxiety in, transmitting 
messages to, and thereby manipulating the perceptions and/or behavior of a 
wider target audience (Terrorism Definition, 2009). AQI became terrorists as 
opposed to insurgents, losing their subjective legitimacy within the population. 
                                            
80 In the 2005 provincial elections, voter turnout in Al Anbar was less than 2% (Russo, 2009). 
81 More than 80 percent turned out in Ramadi and other insurgent strongholds in far western 
Iraq's Upper Euphrates valley, estimated a Ramadi election official, Yaseen Nouri. Election 
officials in cities of the Kurdish-populated north reported 70 percent participation (Knickmeyer & 
Finer, 2005). 
82 Terrorism is based off the triadic relationship between the perpetrator, victim, and wider 
target audience as opposed to just perpetrator and the victim (Terrorism Definition, 2009). 
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This transformative event raised the moral and public good incentives to act 
against AQI. This resulted in mobilization away from AQI, thereby, diminishing 
their organizational capacity and available options to control the population 
(channel).  
The second transformative event was the February 22, 2006, AQI 
bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque in Samarra. Up to this point, AQI had failed 
to incite large-scale sectarian violence between the Sunni and Shiite populations.  
They could hardly have picked a more provocative one than al-
Askari. It is associated with three venerated Shi'ite imams, including 
the Mahdi, or Hidden Imam, who is believed to have disappeared in 
878 into a tunnel directly under al-Askari. The two imams buried in 
the shrine were the Mahdi's father and grandfather. Most Shi'ites 
believe that the Mahdi will one day reappear as a messiah to bring 
justice to the world. That makes al-Askari one of Shi'ite Islam's 
holiest sites, exceeded in veneration only by the shrines of Najaf 
and Karbala. Even Samarra's Sunnis hold al-Askari in high esteem. 
Struggling to explain their emotions at the sight of the shattered 
dome, many Shi'ites cited the U.S. response to the collapsing 
towers of the World Trade Center. "This is our 9/11," became a 
common refrain for Shi'ite commentators. (Ghosh, 2006) 
The bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque initiated widespread sectarian 
violence throughout Iraq, including Anbar. AQI’s strategy aimed to create a civil 
war between Sunni and Shia backfired when AQI could not protect the Sunnis 
from retribution from the Shia death squads. This attack not only accounted for 
loss of legitimacy in Anbar, it caused mass mobilization throughout the Muslim 
world in opposition to AQI’s tactics. Even Ayman Al Zawahari, AQ Deputy 
Commander, decried Zarqawi for alienating Muslim public opinion through his 
routine resort to indiscriminant killing of Iraqi civilians (Wright, 2005; Phillips, 
2008, p. 7). AQI’s actions not only created the moral and public goods incentives 
of the tribes in opposition to AQI, but also that of the population of Iraq as a 
whole. Consequently, the value of the alliance between the tribes and AQI 
diminished as the sectarian violence increased (Phillips, 2008, p. 13). 
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Stemmed by the aftermath of the December 2005 elections and a failure 
to consolidate a fragmenting insurgency, AQI needed to transform their image. 
“January 16, 2006, AQI’s Media Wing issued a new communiqué announcing the 
formation of a joint military alliance with like-minded Iraqi insurgent factions, to be 
known as the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)” (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 3). 
However, the MSC failed to align disparate Sunni insurgent factions. The 
worsening prospects and the death of their leader, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, left 
AQI needing fighters to fill its ranks and support from a sympathetic population.  
On October 15, 2006, the MSC declared that Anbar and parts of several 
other western provinces form the Islamic State of Iraq, “allegedly with the support 
of a host of new tribal partners…[with] a representative of each tribe” (Kohlmann, 
2007, p. 4). The declaration was an attempt to ‘Iraqify’ AQI, even going so far as 
to develop a shadow government with all key positions headed by fictitious Iraq 
leaders to realign the population in support of the movement. However, it is 
doubtful that the tribes supported the new attempt to assert dominance over the 
Sunni insurgency, much less AQI de facto rule over the Anbar population.  
AQI was trying to take advantage of this weakly controlled territory, 
but they clearly were not in a position to ‘govern’ across so wide an 
area. Declaring a ‘counter-state’ is a classic insurgent technique 
designed to legitimize the resistance and discredit the central 
government. The new strategy implies that ISI/AQI will protect and 
defend Sunnis throughout the new state. (Fishman, 2006) 
By creating the ISI, AQI attempted to jettison the Al Qaeda brand and with 
it, past failures. The transformative frame failed to resonate and further shifted 
the incentives structures against them. “An Iraqi-led coalition of Sunni tribal 
Sheikhs in Anbar publicly announced their split with al Qaeda and began working 
with U.S. military forces to oust the foreign-led terrorist group” (McCary, 2009, p. 
44). An insurgent counter-movement, Reformation and Jihad Front, was making 
gains by consolidating control of the remaining Sunni insurgents who were 
waging war against AQI (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 15). By the fall of 2006, the one 
thing Sunnis, Shiites, GOI/US, and rival insurgents groups could agree on was 
 60
opposition to AQI and the Islamic State of Iraq. The tribes, represented by the 
Anbar awakening, aligned with GOI/US and fought AQI forces in their tribal 
areas. Splinter Sunni insurgent groups were uniting under the Reformation and 
Jihad Front and fighting AQI in ethnic Sunni areas. 
3.  Population Alignment 
The shift can be attributed to “Al Qaeda’s threat to their continued hold on 
power and the developing U.S. military approach” (McCary, 2009, p. 44). 
Timeframe 1 ended with the tribes aligned with AQI, as represented by Type 2. 
The first significant empirical account of a shift in alliance began with the Abu 
Mahal and the Abu Nimr tribes challenging AQI control in the Al Qaim area 
(Long, 2008, p. 78). AQI responded by increasing coercion for tribal 
transgressions. This marks the beginning of the transition period with both AQI 
and the GOI/US utilizing coercion to control the population (Type 1).  
 
 
Table 8.   Population Alignment (Transition Timeframe). 
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“Only after their partnership with Al Qaeda became untenable and there 
were incentives to ally with the U.S. did they choose to form a new alliance. 
Tribal leaders in Anbar began quietly forming alliances with U.S. military forces 
against Al Qaeda” (McCary, 2009, p. 43) because of GOI/US tribal engagement 
strategy focused on channeling. The GOI/US began to channel resources 
through tribal leaders to win their cooperation. With the cooperation to the tribal 
leaders, came increased depth of social control and breadth with addition of the 
tribal security forces. “The alliances came from two groups: the Anbar Salvation 
Council, led by the former governor of Ramadi, Fasal al-Gaoud83 and the 
Awakening, led by Abd al Sattar,84 sheikh of the Albu Risha tribe” (McCary, 
2009, p. 48). The outcome of the GOI/US channeling and AQI coercion is the 
population aligning with GOI/US (Type 3). 
 
 
Figure 9.   Strategic Interaction Model: Transition Timeframe (McCormick, 
2008). 
                                            
83 Al-Gaoud was instrumental in forming the Albu Mahal Desert Protectors in 2005, a tribal 
militia along the remote Syrian desert border in Al Qaim and an important example of tribal 
willingness to resist Al Qaeda (McCary, 2009, p. 48). 
84 In September 2006, abd al Sattar publicly announces his group would resist AQI and seek 
U.S. support (McCary, 2009, p. 49). 
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D.  CONCLUSION 
“The Anbar experience illustrates that indigenous proxies can play a 
critical role in eradicating jihadist terrorist, appearing to vindicate the ‘indirect 
approach’ to counter-terrorism that was advocated in the most recent 
Quadrennial Defense Review” (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006; Phillips, 
2008, p. 20). The results of the change in strategy are undeniable. “U.S. 
casualties are down significantly from their peak in mid-2007, the level of 
violence in Iraq is lower than at any point since 2005, and Baghdad seems the 
safest it has been since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime” (Simon, 2008). The 
following figure depicts the SIGACT totals for Anbar by year. Anbar peaked with 
13,902 SIGACTs in 2006, followed by 7,226 SIGACTs in 2007, and finally, 
dropped to the lowest levels of the war in 2008 at 1,157 (W. Marm, personal 
communication, September 11, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 10.   SIGACT total by Province 
The effects of the surge have been mischaracterized. “The number of 
troops associated with the surge, often credited for increasing stability in the 
region, is much less important than the strategic change to empower local 
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leaders” (McCary, 2009, p. 51).85 The surge contributed by providing additional 
security forces to augment the tribal partners, but more importantly, it was how 
the GOI/US forces were employed. The troops deployed into the Iraqi 
communities to enhance the GOI/US effort to channel the population away from 
AQI. The additional security forces, U.S. and tribal elements, combined with the 
resources provided to tribal leadership aligned the population with GOI/US. 
“Iraq experienced a spreading social movement, expanding along kinship 
lines that could be best described as a tribal rebellion against AQI by a large 
body of accidental guerillas who had formerly allowed themselves to be exploited 
by the takfiris” (Kilcullen, 2008, p. 2). The GOI/US adopted a population centric 
strategy aimed at winning the influence and legitimacy of the tribes as opposed 
to defeating AQI.  
With the tribes aligned with the GOI/US, AQI lost access to the mobilizing 
structures, drastically diminishing their organizational capacity. The naysayers 
argue that tribal militias pose a greater long-term threat to the stability of Iraq 
than AQI (Simon, 2008). However, “An armed and organized Sunni population 
was not necessarily a destabilizing political factor. It helped create an informal 
authority structure that helped build political unity and social coherence within the 
Sunni community, moving away from the situation of hundreds of fragmented and 
independent insurgent groups, and community leaders unable to control them, 
which plagued initial attempts to de-escalate the Sunni insurgency” (Kilcullen, 
2008, p. 4). “As Col McFarland observes, ‘No matter how imperfect the tribal 
system appeared to us, it was capable of providing social order and control 
through culturally appropriate means where governmental control was weak” 
(McCary, 2009, p. 54). The tribes remain very pragmatic and require 
                                            
85 “General Patreaus’s new counter-insurgency strategy, or the surge, was not actually 
implemented on the ground until mid-2007. The strategy cannot explain the birth or effects of the 
Awakening, which began as early as 2005 and gained momentum throughout 2006” (McCary, 
2009 p. 52). 
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concessions86 from the GOI. The “newly formed alliances in the region will 
succeed or fail not based on political or religious affiliation, but on whether the 
groups’ interest continue to converge on common incentives, such as political 
participation and economic redevelopment” (McCary, 2009, p. 53). 
The tactical power gained from the alliance with the tribes does not 
account for the drop in violence. The fact is the insurgents, militias, death 
squads, security forces, and local AQI members were one in the same (McCary, 
2009, p. 52). The GOI/US was able to win the allegiance of the tribal leaders, 
although culturally consistent channeling, which increased their depth of social 
control. “The strategy of building alliances with local tribal leaders and reconciling 
with former fighters has been mentioned by newly appointed head of U.S. 
Central Command, Gen. David H. Petraeus, as an important option in the 
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan against the resurgent Taliban and Al 
Qaeda” (McCary, 2009, p. 45).  
The successes in Iraq could be less about what the GOI/US did than what 
AQI did.  
If AQI was ever going to have achieved its goals, it would have 
needed to have augmented its own military capabilities by carefully 
cultivating local alliances and steadily persuading these allies as to 
the merits of the jihadi cause. Instead, AQI consistently over-rated it 
value as an alliance partner to the Sunni population, while 
simultaneously underestimating the degree of resentment it was 
generating through the many burdens it was imposing on its host. 
(Phillips, 2008, p. 15) 
AQI and the tribes’ interests diverged when AQI began to target the Iraq 
population. The threat posed by the GOI/US was no longer enough to align the 
tribes with AQI. Therefore, they attempted to create a civil war between the Sunni 
and Shia populations to unite the Sunni population in opposition to the Shia 
dominated GOI. Al Qaeda Central recognized the futility of AQI’s strategy. 
                                            
86 Concessions made while negotiating from a position of weakness, real or perceived, can 
signal the opposition’s vulnerability.  
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Al-Zawahiri, in his letter, tried to convince al-Zarqawi of the need for 
a more savvy political approach rather than the sole reliance on 
attacks. He was saying that, if al Qaeda is to become a competitive 
player, it needs to gain popular support, tolerate the Shia, use the 
ideology card judiciously and understand that the bulk of Muslims 
(especially the ulema) do not share the Wahhabi ideology. He also 
urged al-Zarqawi against appearing the cruel terrorist by carrying 
out and broadcasting hostage executions. Among the things, which 
the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will 
never find palaTable . . . are the scenes of slaughtering the 
hostages. Al Zawahiri reminded Al-Zarqawi that ‘more than half of 
this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media . . . we are in 
a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our ummah. 
(STRATFOR, 2005) 
AQI attempted to use religious ideology to legitimize their activities and 
garner support. However, the attempt to assert their Islamist agenda on the tribes 
was perceived as illegitimate, and ultimately, led the pragmatic Anbar tribes to 
search for alternatives. AQI actions to circumvent the tribal structure made the 
alliance possible. The tribal leaders sought the support of the GOI/US and 
received the necessary resources to win the allegiance of the tribal members 
away from AQI. With AQI isolated and the GOI/US enjoying the additional depth 
and breadth that came with the alignment, AQI was defeated in Al Anbar. To 
some, this short-term fix ultimately is a threat to the viability of the Iraqi 
government. However, new political alliances are now forming across sectarian 
divides to include Prime Minister Malaki’s Dawa Party with members of the Anbar 
Awakening for the upcoming Iraqi national elections (Parker, 2009). Any long-
term solution need have to address the problems created by the sectarian 
divides that manifest in the political structure of Iraq. 
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IV.  GAME THEORY AND AGENT-BASED MODELING 
When the agents use adaptive rather than optimizing strategies, 
deducing the consequences is often impossible; simulation 
becomes necessary. (Axelrod, 1997) 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical framework attempts to explain the mechanisms and 
processes that affect the interaction of repression tactics resulting in population 
alignment (DV). The game theoretic approach utilizes basic techniques and 
progressively increases in complexity to capture nuances of our theoretical 
framework. Game theory, although limited to cross-sections of time, is used to 
examine the external validity of the theoretical framework of which test 
implications were not fully vindicated by the empirical observations using process 
tracing. In addition, agent-based modeling (ABM) is introduced to overcome the 
limitations of game theory and to determine the applicability of the theory into 
areas not supported with empirics. The ABM overcomes the stylized nature of 
game theory by not focusing exclusively on equilibrium. Instead, ABM captures 
the dynamical history of the mechanisms and processes by manipulating the 
parameters that alter the effects of the interaction of repression tactics on 
population alignment. Congruence tests compares ABM and empirics of the 
Anbar Awakening case study.87  
The strategic interaction model88 requires an understanding of the 
mechanisms and processes that explain the predicted outcomes and spatial 
relationships.  
                                            
87 The Anbar Awakening case study utilizes empirics over time to test the theoretical 
framework for congruence. Additionally, government, insurgency, and population are used 
interchangeably with GOI/US, AQI, and tribes throughout the chapter. 
88 It is important to understand that the strategic interaction model depicts a constant state 
given a particular time and space; however, the spatial relationship is modulated by the 




Figure 11.   Strategic Interaction Model (McCormick, 2008). 
Figure 12 provides an alternate visualization of the strategic interaction 
model by illustrating the two strategies and the hypothesized population 
alignments. However, for simplicity, the population is given only three alignment 
choices instead of four.89 
 
 
Figure 12.   Alternate Visual of Strategic Interaction Model 
                                            
89 It is assumed that in a battle over resources, the government has an advantage over the 
insurgency and the population will align with government.  
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An extensive form game is created to visualize the potential decisions 
available to each of the three players; government, insurgency, and population. 
Figure 1390 highlights that multiple players with multiple strategies interact to 
increase the possible outcomes of the game. By simplifying the population’s 
choices to three, the possible combination of outcomes is twelve. The extensive 
form of the game does not account for the player’s utility of action. The 
highlighted gray boxes correspond to the predicted outcomes of the strategic 
interaction model without regard to the mechanisms and processes. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Extensive Form Game of Strategic Interaction Model. 
                                            
90 Figure 13 contains the following abbreviations: G or GOV is used for government, I or INS 
is used for insurgency, F is used for fragment, C is used for coercion, Ch is used for channeling, 
and A is used for aligned. 
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Not accounting for the mechanisms and processes results in four strategy 
profiles in equilibrium.91 Continuing the assumption that the strategic interaction 
model would provide four strategy profiles in equilibrium, backwards induction is 
utilized to determine dominant strategies for all players. Assuming the population 
is pragmatic and the government and insurgency desires the population’s 
alignment, the following dominant strategies are concluded: Government; 
Insurgency; Population = Ch; Ch, Ch; F, Align I, Align G, Align G. 
However, the initial assumption of the strategic interaction model 
remaining static is not consistent with the theoretical framework. The 
mechanisms and processes, enhances or mitigates the effects of the interacting 
repression strategies, modulate the spatial relationship of the players within the 
strategic interaction model. Additionally, the use of backward induction 
determines strategies from a known outcome. To arrive at the dominant 
strategies requires all players have common knowledge of the strategic 
interaction model without regards to the mechanisms and processes. The value 
of the extensive form game is illustrating the complexity of the interacting 
repression tactics as they affect population alignment. Building on the extensive 
form of the game begins by assigning ordinal utilities to the three players. 
B.  ORDINAL SCALE COALITION GAMES 
The three player coalition games manipulate the utility to replicate the 
observations from process tracing the Anbar Awakening. The static nature of 





                                            
91 The four strategy profiles in equilibrium are the gray shaded boxes in the extensive form 
game; CCF, CChAI, ChCAG, and ChChAG. Remembering that for ChChAG, it is assumed the 
government enjoys a resource advantage and over time should win the resource battle and 
achieve population alignment. 
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behavior of the participants and modulation of population alignment. The three 
iterations correspond to the three observed population alignments observed in 
the process tracing of the case study.92  
Ordinal values93 simplify the game and determine possible outcomes. The 
coalition game simplifies the extensive form game by providing only two 
strategies for each player. The government and insurgency maintain their original 
strategies of coercing and channeling. However, the population has only two 
strategies,94 alignment with the government or alignment with the insurgency. 
The assumptions are that all coercion is indiscriminant and the government and 
insurgent organizational capacity determine what repression strategy controls the 
population. 
1. Iteration One (Timeframe One) 
The organizational capacity of the GOI/US for timeframe one (2003–2006) 
is illustrated in Figure 14. The GOI/US has a breadth advantage and utilizes this 
advantage by relying heavily on coercive repression tactics. On the other hand, 
AQI is socially embedded within the tribes and has a depth advantage enabling a 
channeling strategy. The tribes, pragmatic in nature, prefer AQI’s channeling 
efforts and align accordingly.  
                                            
92 In the Anbar Awakening case study, it is contended that in time period one, 2003–2006, 
the GOI/US predominantly utilize coercion, AQI predominantly use channeling, and the 
population is aligned with the insurgency (AQI). Early in the transition period, the GOI/US 
continue to coerce, AQI shift to a more coercive heavy strategy, and the population becomes 
disenfranchised and begins looking for alternatives (fragments). As the transition period 
progresses, the GOI/US shift to channeling, AQI continue to increase coercion, and the 
population aligns with GOI/US. 
93 Ordinal values only rank preference and are not concerned with the potential payoff. 
94 This adjustment is necessary to provide a simple 2x2x2 game that illustrates potential 
outcomes. When viewing the utility scale for the population, note that coercion—coercion (CC) 
results in low values. Although it is possible to infer that the population is not happy with this 
outcome, this does not account for the fragmentation option and results in another limitation of 
the three-player coalition game. 
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Figure 14.   Organizational Capacity (2003–2006). 
The analysis of organizational capacity derived from observations of the 
case study serves as a basis for assigning ordinal utility values to potential 
outcomes. In timeframe one, both GOI/US and AQI prefer to maintain their 
repression strategy based on organizational capacity, as opposed to what would 
result in the desired population alignment. The pragmatic population capitalizes 
by aligning with the player offering resources via channeling. Table 9 depicts 






Table 9.   Ordinal Utility Scales (Timeframe One). 
Applying each player’s utility value into a three player game matrix, an 
equilibrium exists when the government coerces, insurgency channels, and the 
population aligns with the insurgents, Figure 15.  
 
 
Figure 15.   Alignment Game (Timeframe One). 
Iteration one of the ordinal value coalition games is consistent with the 
observations of the Anbar Awakening. The government was coercing and 
insurgents were channeling resulting in an alignment with the insurgency.  
 74
Strategic moves are determined through analysis of the game. Neither 
player has an advantage in a first move. There are no threats and the 
government has a promise. The government promises the population to channel 
if the population aligns with the government. The promise works because it helps 
the population and hurts95 the government. However, does the population 
aligning with the GOI/US actually hurt the coalition? It does not, and therefore, 
utility based off desired outcomes would have better served the GOI/US in 
formulating their population control strategy.  
2.  Iteration Two (Early Transition) 
The GOI/US was slow to realize the need to change their repression in the 
early transition timeframe.96 However, AQI dramatically changed their repression 
strategy becoming increasingly coercive to maintain population control in the 
response to the threat posed by the election cycles of 2005. AQI viewed the 
civilian population as legitimate targets of coercion to prevent support for the 
democratic process. The change in AQI strategy resulted in a loss of depth in 
Anbar. The changes in strategy affect the organizational capacity based on the 
reaction of the population. Figure 1697 is a subjective characterization of the 
organizational capacities derived from the case study. The breadth for GOI/US 
and AQI remained constant from timeframe one through the early transitional 
timeframe, but the depth of social control for AQI diminished.  
                                            
95 The government would prefer to utilize their advantage breadth to coerce the population 
into an alignment.  
96 Testing for longitudinal congruence with the actual case study of the Anbar Awakening. 
97 During the early transitional timeframe, it is assumed that breadth for either side remained 
relatively constant; however, the loss of AQI embeddedness (depth) is significant. The figure is 
viewed as constant sum; therefore, the assumption is the amount of depth lost by AQI was 
gained by GOI/US. This provided additional opportunities for the GOI/US to channel as a means 
of controlling the population. 
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Figure 16.   Organizational Capacity (Early Transitional Timeframe). 
The ordinal utilities scale for iteration two changes to reflect AQI’s 
preference based on desired outcome versus organizational capacity. Initially, 
AQI effectively coerced dissenters to maintain social control. As AQI became 
increasingly coercive, the pool of dissention increased; thus, requiring more 
coercion. The GOI/US continued to value coercive tactics over alignment 
outcomes. The population remained pragmatic and preferred the alignment with 




Table 10.   Ordinal Utility Scales (Early Transitional Timeframe). 
The second iteration coalition game utilizes the utility from Table 10. The 
game depicted in Figure 17 captures the shift from cell two of the strategic 
interaction model to cell one. The strategic interaction model predicts when both 
sides coerce, the population fragments, but the coalition game does not provide 
this option. Given a choice of alignment, considering this constraint, the 
population aligns with the insurgency.98  
The alignment in Figure 17 is fragile based on the theoretical framework. 
In cell one, the government or insurgent can improve by changing strategy. In 
cell four, one side sees the futility of a competition of resources and deviate. The 
game fails to capture the increasing number of Anbaris looking for an alternative 
political order (fragment) to that provided by AQI. This population ultimately grew 
to provide the GOI/US the opportunity to channel the population away from AQI 
in iteration three.  
 
 
                                            
98 The 2x2x2 alignment game only captures two strategies for the population; however, in 
reality, the population has other options, such as fragmentation. With the population fragmented, 
it would not necessarily choose alignment with either side. Figure 17 captures a weaken 
population alignment with AQI. To achieve a desirable population alignment and more stable 
equilibrium, the GOI/US will have to explore channeling options. It is assumed that cell four and 
cell one in the strategic interaction model are the least stable situations. 
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Figure 17.   Alignment Game (Early Transitional Timeframe). 
3.   Iteration Three (Late Transition) 
With AQI increasing control over all aspects of life, the tribal leaders 
began a search for an alternative. In September 2006, the Anbar Awakening 
formed in opposition to AQI and the tribal leaders, sought the support of the 
GOI/US. AQI responded with harsh coercion of the tribal leaders. At the same 
time, the GOI/US utilized the channeling opportunity to re-empower the tribal 
leaders influence over his people.  
Figure 18 captures the organizational capacity of the government and the 
insurgents with the tribes aligned in support of the GOI/US. AQI suffered a 
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significant decline in depth and breadth. The increased GOI/US depth provided 
the opportunity to channel effectively as a means of controlling the population.99  
 
 
Figure 18.   Organizational Capacity (Late Transitional Timeframe). 
The GOI/US saw the benefits of the newly adopted population centric 
strategy. The GOI/US valued the tribes’ alignment through whatever means 
available; however, it saw that channeling provided economy of force. 
                                            
99 The GOI/US began capitalizing on the channeling opportunities made partly possible 
through AQI’s mistakes of assuming a coercive heavy strategy inconsistent with tribal societal 
norms. By channeling, the GOI/US not only dramatically increased its depth, but also increased 
its breadth by redirecting the tribes’ efforts toward stability of the province. The tribes began 
targeting AQI and imposed negative social sanctions on targeting the GOI/US. The tribal security 
forces helped increase the breadth of GOI/US, but also enabled the security conditions to allow 
the GOI/US to spread the current force structure to multiple areas. The spreading of GOI/US 
security forces was a change from the previous forward operating base (FOB) centric 
employment of troops. This new employment of troops allowed GOI/US security forces to 
maintain a presence in previously denied territories and further channel the population away from 
the tribes. 
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Meanwhile, AQI continued to value the tribes’ alignment through all available 
means and only increased its coercion. The tribes’ remained pragmatic and 
placed the most value on an alignment providing the most benefit. The utility for 




Table 11.   Ordinal Utility Scales (Late Transitional Timeframe). 
The GOI/US valued the outcome of population alignment and recognized 
the tribes’ were responding favorably to channeling efforts. The shift in GOI/US 
strategy was an attempt to gain the population’s alignment. Figure 19, 
demonstrates the shift from cell one of the strategic interaction model to cell 
three late in the transitional timeframe. Cell three of the strategic interaction 
model captures a population closely aligned with the government. Cell three of 
the strategic interaction model is more stable than cell one, but the strength of 
the alliance can modulate in time and space. This implies that each player must 
understand the impact of the interacting strategies and be willing to manipulate 




Figure 19.   Alignment Game (Late Transitional Timeframe). 
The iterated coalition games utilizing ordinal utility scales help illustrate the 
dynamics of each player’s decision cycle. Additionally, the games highlight 
potential changes in strategy by understanding the strategic moves. However, 
the games are static and require multiple iterations with adjusted utility values to 
provide insight. The use of ordinal utility values provides insight to each player’s 
preferences and ignores the potential disparity for each player regarding payoff. 
By understanding the behavior of each player in a given time and space and 
applying the theoretical framework, it was possible to model the likely outcomes 
during the different timeframes of the Anbar Awakening. Although interesting, its 
use is limited in projecting the model to different problem sets without prior 
extensive knowledge of each player’s preferences. Next, the same game format 
is used, but to provide a better predictive tool, the utilities are changed to cardinal 
values and make the game constant sum.  
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C.  CONSTANT SUM COALITION GAMES 
To establish the constant sum game, it is necessary to agree upon what is 
logical.  
Simply creating a two by two game out of the strategic interaction model 
immediately becomes problematic. Presenting three scenarios demonstrates 
how difficult it can be to provide a generic game theoretic approach to the 
strategic interaction model. Constant sum games require general assumptions 
for each player to determine how cardinal values affect the game. The first 
scenario assumes the government enjoys and understands its resource 
advantage, Figure 20. The second scenario assumes that the government does 
not take advantage of its resource advantage, placing higher utility on 
coercion/coercion than channeling/channeling,100 Figure 21. Finally, the scenario 
where the government realizes its resource advantage and the insurgency 
realizes the futility of competing in battle of resources is considered, Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Government with Resource Advantage (2x2). 
 
 
                                            
100 This is probable if the government viewed coercion/coercion as a less resource intense 








Figure 21.   Government Prefers Coercion/Coercion to Channel/Channel (2x2). 
 
Figure 22.   Insurgency Realizing Government’s Resource Advantage (2x2). 
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Expanding101 the constant sum coalition game, Figure 22, to a 2x2x2 
determines the dynamics of potential coalitions and subsequent payoffs. For the 
following game, it is assumed that the government and insurgency place the 
highest utility on the interaction on a population alignment in their favor. The 
game also presumes that the government prefers the insurgency to coerce when 
the population alignment is with the insurgency.102 Table 12 illustrates the ordinal 
utility scale for the initial game. By implementing the ordinal utility scale, 
equilibrium exists at channeling-coercion and the population aligns with the 
government, Figure 23. 
 
 
Table 12.   Ordinal Utility Scales (Initial Game). 
 
                                            
101 Expanded analysis of all three scenarios was performed. The sensitivity of likely 
coalitions was found to be negligible between the three scenarios; all three scenarios resulted in 
the same likely coalitions. Differences in the three scenarios were in the overall values of 
coalitions and payoffs. Also, expanding the games in Figures 20 and 21, weak equilibrium at 
channeling-channeling-aligned with government and channel-channel-aligned with insurgency 
was found. The equilibrium was weak because the population was indifferent between the two 
choices. The authors did not assume the government would win a battle of resources to provide 
fairness to the game and to assess likely coalitions with resources being equal. Scenario three, 
Figure 22, differed in that the constant sum game provided potential equilibrium at channel-
coercion-aligned with government; coercion-coercion-aligned with insurgency and coercion-
channeling-aligned with insurgency. 




Figure 23.   Initial Game (Ordinal Utility Values). 
With an established equilibrium at channeling-coercion-population aligned 
with the government, the ordinal utility scales convert to cardinal utility scales. 
Cardinal values correspond to each player’s ordinal rankings zero through four, 




Table 13.   Ordinal Rankings Converted to Cardinal Values (Initial Game). 
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Figure 24.   Initial Game as Constant Sum (Cardinal Utility Values). 
The initial constant sum game, Figure 24, illustrates three potential 
equilibriums.103 Further analysis of this game includes the payoffs for each 
player, value of coalitions, and potential coalitions, Table 14. Although the 
population is indifferent at channel-channel, the insurgents are unlikely to commit 
to a competition of resources resulting in the population ultimately preferring an 
alignment with the government. When comparing the values of the game, the 
insurgency prefers a coalition with the government rather than the population. A 
possible explanation is the insurgency is reluctant to invest the time and effort to 
gain popular support; instead, they would rather receive concessions from the 
government to achieve their goals. In reality, this is a very unlikely outcome 
because the government is better off acting alone than to provide concessions 
and align with the insurgency. Lastly, it is important to highlight the value of the  
 
 
                                            
103 Each of the equilibriums is weak because the equilibrium has at least one player who is 
indifferent in their strategy. 
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population aligning with the insurgency or the government as being relatively 
small. However, this game does not account for the mechanisms and processes 
that modulate the effects of interacting repression tactics.  
 
 
Table 14.   Ordinal Rankings Converted to Cardinal Values (Initial Game). 
The constant sum game contributes to validating the assumption that a 
resource advantage is helpful in a COIN environment. However, due to the 
game’s static nature and subjectivity of the utility scales, it is difficult to provide 
predictive insight and potential strategy changes due to the existence of three 
weak equilibriums. “There are many things wrong with equilibrium analysis 
including the possibility that it oversimplifies by neglecting processes of 
adjustment, or exaggerates the prevalence of equilibrium by neglecting shifts in 
the parameters that determine equilibrium” (Schelling, 1978, p. 26). “Even when 
the conditions are right for equilibrium analysis, understanding the dynamics of 
the system may still be important” (Miller & Page, 2007, p. 83.). The requirement 
is for a model with less subjectivity and the ability to manipulate the mechanism 
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and processes that affect population alignment. “Computational models using 
agent-based objects are very natural way to explore the dynamic behavior of a 
system “(Miller & Page, 2007, p. 84). The model would assist in the development 
of potential strategies to achieve desired outcomes. This would assist in 
overcoming the heavy reliance on the application of logical utility scales, which is 
almost certainly arguable. An agent-based model is created utilizing the 
theoretical framework and insight provided by the previous games. To create a 
model that captures the uncertainty of real world situations, agents are assigned 
rules of behavior. By instituting agent-based modeling, it is possible to relax the 
need for completely rational actors and stop focusing on expected equilibriums; 
thus, letting the dynamics of the model compile outcomes within a prescribed 
behavioral space.  
D.  AGENT-BASED MODEL 
“Many of our existing analytical tools avoid an emphasis on dynamic 
processes and focus on equilibrium states. The conditions that favor equilibrium 
analysis are likely the exception rather than the rule in many complex adaptive 
social systems” (Miller & Page, 2007, p. 83). An agent-based model104 is created 
by coding the mechanisms and processes into a set of parameters that be can 
be controlled and manipulated to understand the conditions under which the 
population is more likely to align itself with the counterinsurgent. “The purpose of 
agent-based modeling105 is to understand properties of complex social systems 
                                            
104 An agent-based model consists of individual agents, commonly implemented in software 
as objects. Agent objects have states and rules of behavior. Running such a model simply 
amounts to instantiating an agent population, letting the agents interact, and monitoring what 
happens (Axtell, 2000, p. 2). 
105 “This method of doing science can be contrasted with standard methods of induction and 
deduction. Induction is the discovery of patterns in empirical data. Deduction, on the other hand, 
involves specifying a set of axioms and proving consequences that can be derived from those 
assumptions. Agent-based modeling is a third way of doing science. Like deductions, it starts with 
a set of explicit assumptions. However, unlike deduction, it does not prove theorems. Instead, an 
agent-based model generates simulated data that can be analyzed inductively. Unlike typical 
induction, however, the simulated data come from a rigorously specified set of rules rather than 
direct measurement of the real world. Simulation is necessary because the interactions of 
adaptive agents typically lead to non-linear effects that are not amendable to deductive tools of 
formal mathematics” (Axelrod, 1997, pp. 3–6). 
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through the analysis of simulation” (Axelrod, 1997, p. 3). The model uses insight 
provided by process tracing the case study and the previous games. To create a 
model that captures the uncertainty of real world situations, agents are assigned 
rules of behavior. By instituting agent-based modeling, the need for completely 
rational actors is relaxed and focus shifts away from expected equilibriums. The 
model compiles dynamic outcomes of locally interacting agents within a 
prescribed behavioral space and tests the dependence of results against 
parameter settings and assumptions. The dynamic outcomes produce population 
alignment referred to as emergent properties106 of the model.  
The ABM is constructed to account for the different aspects of the 
theoretical framework within the model. “To create models that go beyond our 
initial understanding, we need to incorporate frameworks for emergence. That is, 
we need to have the underlying elements of the model flexible enough so that 
new, unanticipated features naturally arise within the model” (Miller & Page, 
2007, p. 69). The model is designed to simulate an adaptive social system by 
creating agents with bounded rationality.107 The model’s potential provides 
external validity to the single case study. The ABM adds to the internal logic 
provided by the game theoretic framework, by demonstrating how the 
mechanisms and processes modulated population alignment over time. After 
examining each timeframe from the case study, the ABM demonstrates how 
population alignment modulates within the strategic interaction model, accounting 
for the three weak equilibria established in the constant sum game. “When the 
agents use adaptive rather than optimizing strategies, deducing the  
 
 
                                            
106 Emergence is a phenomenon whereby well-formulated aggregate behavior arises from 
localized, individual behavior. Moreover, such aggregate patterns should be immune to 
reasonable variations in the individual behavior (Miller & Page, 2007, p. 46).  
107 The simulation of an agent-based model is often the only viable way to study populations 
of agents who are adapter rather than fully rational (Axelrod, 1997, p. 4). The flexibility of 
computational tools make them well suited for considering models of boundedly rational agents 
who adapt their behavior (Miller & Page, 2007, p. 82). 
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consequences is often impossible; simulation becomes necessary” (Axelrod, 
1997, p. 4). NetLogo108 is the platform to create a modeling environment, which 
replicates a population’s social environment.  
The intent behind using ABM is to provide agents simple rules of behavior 
that produce complex results.109 First, a world110 is created by assigning 
ownership of the different parameters to the population (turtles) and the 
government and insurgency (patches). Figure 25 illustrates the ABM at work and 
serves as a visual reference for how the ABM works.  
                                            
108 NetLogo is a programmable modeling environment for simulating natural and social 
phenomena. It was authored by Uri Wilensky in 1999 and is in continuous development at the 
Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling. NetLogo is written entirely in 
Java (version 1.4.1) and is provided free of charge from Northwestern University.  
109 The complexity of agent-based modeling should be in the simulated results, not in the 
assumptions of the model. If the goal is to deepen understanding of some fundamental process, 
then simplicity of the assumptions is important, and realistic representation of all the details of a 
particular setting is not. The realistic representation of many details is unnecessary and even 
counterproductive (Axelrod, 1997, pp. 5–6). 
110 The NetLogo world is a two dimensional world composed of agents. Agents are beings 
that can follow instructions. Each agent can execute its own activity, all simultaneously. In 
NetLogo, there are three types of agents: turtles, patches, and the observer. Turtles are agents 
that move around in the world. The world is two-dimensional and is divided into a grid of patches. 
Each patch is a square piece of "ground" over which turtles can move. The observer does not 
have a location. Consider it as looking out over the world of turtles and patches. When NetLogo 
starts up, there are no turtles yet. The observer can make new turtles. Patches can make new 
turtles as well. (Patches cannot move, but otherwise they are just as "alive" as turtles and the 
observer are.) Patches have coordinates. The patch in the center of the world has coordinates (0, 
0). The patch's coordinates are called pxcor and pycor. Just like in the standard mathematical 
coordinate plane, pxcor increases when moving to the right and pycor increases when moving up. 
The total number of patches is determined by the settings screen-edge-x and screen-edge-y. 
When NetLogo starts up, both screen-edge-x and screen-edge-y are 17. This means that pxcor 
and pycor both range from -17 to 17, so there are 35 times 35, or 1,225 patches total. (It is 
possible to change the number of patches by editing NetLogo's Graphics window.) Turtles also 
have coordinates: xcor and ycor. A patch's coordinates are always integers, but a turtle's 
coordinates can have decimals. For speed, NetLogo always draws a turtle on-screen as if it were 
standing in the center of its patch; but in fact, the turtle can be positioned at any point within the 
patch. The world of patches is not bounded, but "wraps"—so when a turtle moves past the edge 
of the world, it disappears and reappears on the opposite edge. Every patch has the same 
number of "neighbor" patches—if a patch is on the edge of the world, then some of the 
"neighbors" are on the opposite edge. 
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Figure 25.   Strategic Interaction of Repression ABM  
The agents represent the population and the environment around them 
influences their decisions.111 The agent is assigned a random risk aversion at 
birth and chooses to align with the government, insurgency, or to fragment based 
on environmental surroundings. The vision slider112 creates neighborhoods  
 
                                            
111 An important principle from social psychology is “social proof,” which applies especially to 
what people decide is correct behavior. As Cialdini explains, we view a behavior as more correct 
in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it (Axelrod, 1997, p. 58). 
112 The slider moves left or right, is used to adjust parameter settings prior to beginning the 
model and can be adjusted during the run to observe effects of a parameter change. The vision 
slider allows each person (turtle) the ability to see the other people within the radius of zero to ten 
patches. 
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based on the population within the radius of each person’s vision. The population 
density slider and the size of the world determine the size of population in the 
environment. 
The static patches represent the government and insurgency. The actions 
of the government and insurgency are determined by adjusting the sliders for the 
probability of government and insurgent coercion,113 social embeddedness of the 
insurgency, and government depth114 and breadth. The parameters are randomly 
assigned to the patches based on the probabilities of the respective sliders. Each 
patch represents the government and insurgent effects on the environment 
because of the interaction of repression tactics and social embeddedness and 
organizational capacity of the government capture the effects of the mechanisms 
and processes. The ABM utilizes a stochastic process to capture the effects of 
the mechanisms and processes that modulate population alignment.  
Each agent performs three steps to determine his alignment decision. The 
example below illustrates how an agent aligning government determines his 
decision. Similar logic is used to determine how agents arrive at a decision to 
align with the insurgent or fragment. Step 1. Each agent first determines his 
alignment preference based on the interaction of repression strategies, insurgent 
social embeddedness, and individual risk aversion. Step 2. Once an agent 
determines his alignment preference, the agent then determines the cost and 




                                            
113 The model assumes the probability of channeling is the inverse of the parameter setting 
for the government and insurgent probability of coercion equal to one. For example, if the 
probability of government coercion is set on 0.20, then the government probability of channeling 
is 0.80. 
114 Parameter settings of insurgent social embeddedness and government depth should not 
exceed one when added together. 
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An agent that is leaning towards the government: 
Cost of Aligning Government =   
Benefit of Aligning Government =   
Probability of Government Coercion =   
Probability of Government Channeling =   
Probability of Insurgent Coercion =   
Government Depth =   
Determining Cost: 
Random number is generated =   
If   <  , then set   =   / 2 
If   >  , then set   = ( +  ) / 2 
Determining Benefit: 
Random number is generated =   
If   <  , then set   =   
If   >  , then set   = 0 (zero) 
Step 3. Once the cost and benefit of alignment is established, the agent 
determines the fitness of his decision, the weight of his neighborhood, and enters 
a random lottery to determine alignment decision. 
Cost of Aligning Government =   
Benefit of Aligning Government =   
Number of People in the Neighborhood Leaning Government =   
Total Number of People in the Neighborhood =   
Fitness of Aligning Government =   
Fitness of Aligning Insurgent =   
Fitness of Fragmenting =  
Weight of Aligning Government =   
Weight of Aligning Insurgent =  
Weight of Fragmenting =   
Determining Fitness: 
  1 /           
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Determining Weight: 
Y     
Performing Lottery: 
Random number is generated =   
If   <  , then set Population Color Blue; Aligned Government 
If   > (  +  ), then set Population Color Red; Aligned Insurgent 
If   >   and < (  +  ), then set Population Color Black; 
Fragmented 
The assignment of cost and benefit for each alignment choice is arguable. 
Not every aspect of a person’s decision process is addressed when assigning 
cost and benefit to a particular alignment choice. However, the thought process 
provides a consistent approach to incorporate the interaction of repression 
tactics, depth, breadth, and social embeddedness to the model. Additionally, the 
randomness attempts to capture the fact that every person evaluates cost and 
benefit on an individual basis. 
After initializing the ABM,115 the population moves one step in random 
directions and makes an initial decision based on the interaction of repression 
tactics, risk aversion, and the social embeddedness of the insurgency. The initial 
decision forces the agents to lean116 toward aligning with the government, 
insurgent, or fragmenting. With an initial preference, the agent determines his 
fitness117 based on number of like-minded agents in his neighborhood. “The 
goals or purposes or objectives relate directly to other people and their behavior, 
                                            
115 The ABM initializes by adjusting the parameters and pressing the setup button. After 
pressing the setup button, the world is populated according to the population density slider and 
the population appears as green people. Concurrently, the government and insurgency, in the 
form of patches, establish the actions of the remaining parameters and the environment is 
created. Pressing the go-once button runs the ABM one time period; pressing go runs the model 
continuously and time periods are recorded.  
116 Lean does not equal align with. At this point, the person has only determined a 
preference, but has not chosen to align with either side until he factors in the cost, benefit, and 
what everyone else is doing in his neighborhood. 
117 The fitness is the initial step in determining the effect of bounded rationality. The fitness 
measures the cost and benefit of the persons with the same preference in the neighborhood. The 
assumption is that people faced with difficult problems and finite time attempt to simplify the 
problem and are influenced by the decisions of the people around them. 
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or are constrained by an environment that consists of other people who are 
pursuing their goals or their purposes or their objectives. What we typically have 
is a mode of contingent behavior- behavior that depends on what others are 
doing” (Schelling, 1978, p. 17). The fitness determines the weight118 of the 
neighborhood based on the number of agents with the same preference. In 
essence, the fitness captures the social incentives for the agents to change their 
alignment preferences. To keep the social incentives stochastic,119 the weight of 
the neighborhood enters a random lottery120 to determine alignment with the 
government, insurgent, or to fragment.121  
1. Testing for Congruence against the Anbar Awakening 
The typology chapter discusses how the population alignment modulates 
by way of the mechanisms and processes. However, the game theoretic 
treatment of strategic interaction does not fully capture the dynamic modulation 
and spatial relationships of the population, government, and insurgent 
alignments. The ABM models the modulation of population alignment based on 
the effects of the changing parameters122 and provides the data necessary to 
produce recognizable patterns. Figure 26 illustrates the parameter settings for 
analyzing the case study, longitudinal.  
 
                                            
118 The weight provides a percentage of same preference persons in a given neighborhood. 
119 Since the social nature of alignment preferences is rarely deterministic, a degree of 
randomness is introduced to the impact of the neighborhood on individual decisions.  
120 The lottery is a simplified, but randomized approach for each person to determine 
alignment choices based on the social environment of the neighborhood.  
121 In the ABM, alignment with the government is blue, insurgent is red, and fragment is 
black. Since agents follow behavior rules, the sense is that they are quite homogeneous. 
However, two distinct agents placed in identical environments will generally not respond (behave) 
in the same way; that is, move to the same location (Epstein & Axtell, 1996, p. 25). 
122 A Behavior Space experiment is conducted to test parameter settings observed in the 
case study of the Anbar Awakening. Behavior Space is a software tool integrated with NetLogo 
making it possible to perform experiments with models. It runs a model many times, 
systematically varying the model's settings and recording the results of each model run. This 
process is sometimes called "parameter sweeping,” allowing for the exploration of the model's 
"space" of possible behaviors and determining which combinations of settings cause the 
behaviors of interest (Wilensky, 1999). 
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Figure 26.   Parameter Settings for Examining the Anbar Awakening. 
The ABM produces data congruent with empirical observations, even with 
the assumptions relaxed. To examine each timeframe individually, the depth and 
social embeddedness are held constant.123 Each timeframe has a population 
alignment percentage chart and parameter effects diagram. The population 
percentage chart provides the alignment results based on social embeddedness 
and depth remaining constant and sweeping the remaining parameters. The 
parameter effects diagram illustrates how the remaining parameters modulate 






                                            
123 The depth and social embedded numbers utilized for the ordinal scale examination of the 
timeframes in the game theoretic framework were held constant to show how the population 
alignment could modulate significantly with small changes to parameter settings. 
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a. Timeframe One 
Figure 27 shows the average population alignment data obtained 
by holding government depth to 0.1 and social embeddedness to 0.9 and 
allowing the other parameters to vary.124 The result is congruent with the 
empirical observations derived from process tracing and from the ordinal scale 
game theoretic framework. 
  
 
Figure 27.   ABM Produced Alignment Percentages. 
Figure 28 illustrates how the different parameter settings account 
for the modulation of population alignment when the government depth and 
insurgent social embeddedness remain constant.  
 
                                            
124 The model’s results are highly robust. That is, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis 
that the macro structure of alignment is affected by random permutation because all other 
parameters are allowed to vary.  
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Figure 28.   Effects of Changing Parameters (Timeframe One). 
The shaded red/blue circles highlight patterns produced by the 
model. In timeframe one, the government peaks in population alignment when 
they lessen their coercion and the peaks are slightly higher as the insurgency 
increases125 its amount of coercion. Additionally, the insurgency experiences a 
downward trend in population alignment as the government gains breadth. The 
additional breadth provides the government the ability to influence more of the 
population. The gain in breadth does not necessarily demonstrate a gain in 
population alignment for the government; instead, it shows more of the 
population fragmenting because of the government’s greater effect with its 
coercion.  
                                            
125 Except in the case where GOI/US increases to 70% breadth. In this case, the 
government does best when its coercion is at the lowest and the insurgent coercion is lowest. 
However, with 70% breadth, when the insurgents increase to 20% coercion, GOI does not peak; 
instead, the population fragments at a higher rate.  
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b. Early Transition Timeframe 
During the early transition timeframe, the case study revealed a 
population increasingly disenfranchised with the political order provided by AQI. 
The frustrated tribes began searching for an alternative political order; however, 
the GOI/US were still placing higher utility on a coercive repression strategy. The 
results of process tracing and the game theoretic models indicate the tribes were 
breaking ties with AQI, but were skeptical of aligning with the GOI/US. The 
interaction of repression strategies and the mechanisms and processes 
produced a fragmented population. Figure 27 illustrates the ABM modeled 
alignment percentages. The data produced by the ABM is congruent with the 
typological theory, game theory, and empirical observations. The depth and 
social embeddedness parameter settings, 0.4 and 0.6, for the early transition 
were adjusted to the empirical observations and remain constant, Figure 29.  
Figure 27 illustrates an increased population aligned with the 
government, as well as a larger fragmented population. The fragmented 
population should be intuitive based on the government maintaining a high level 
of coercion and the insurgency beginning to increase its coercive tactics. 
However, less intuitive is how the government maintained the same level of 
coercion, but realized a growth in population alignment. Figure 29 shows how the 
different mechanisms and processes (parameter settings) can significantly 
modulate population alignment. 
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Figure 29.   Effects of Changing Parameters (Timeframe One). 
As the patterns develop,126 the government can decrease the 
amount of people aligned with the insurgency by utilizing even small amounts of 
channeling. The government manages its greatest population alignment when it 
uses the least amount of coercion, has greater depth, and the insurgent uses the 
least amount of coercion. Under such conditions, the government can induce the 
insurgent to resort to coercion to maintain its control of the population. On the 
other hand, the insurgent can attempt to decrease the population aligned with the 
government, increasing the size of the fragmented population, by increasing its  
 
                                            
126 The analysis aims to demonstrate the potential of the model while testing for congruence. 
The data produced from the model can be analyzed many ways and more tests can be run to add 
robustness. However, in the above case, fragment is highest when GOI/US uses 90% coercion. 
At 80% coercion, the government increases; at 90% coercion, fragmentation increases; and at 
100% coercion, the insurgency increases. Additionally, with breadth increasing from 40% to 50%, 
the GOI/US enjoys a 2.3% increase of overall alignment (in Anbar this would equate to an 
increase of 30,000 people).  
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coercive tactics. The insurgency reduced the population aligned with the 
government, but created an opportunity for the government to win alignment 
though channeling an increased pool of disenfranchised people (fragmented). 
c. Late Transition Timeframe 
In the late transition timeframe, the GOI/US capitalized on the 
opportunity to channel the increased fragmented population. Figure 27 captures 
the data produced from the ABM illustrating the alignment percentage as of late 
transition. Consistent with the previous examinations, all parameters in Figure 30 
are swept while holding depth and social embeddedness constant at 0.9 and 0.1, 
respectively.  
The results are congruent127 with the findings from empirical 
observations and the game theory models. Figure 30 illustrates a downward 
trend for insurgent alignment as the government increases breadth; the cost of 
being an insurgent is increasing. The government is increasing alignment as they 
increase coercion. With the increased depth gained late in the transition, the 
population perceives the government coercion against the insurgents legitimate. 
Additionally, when the government utilized the least amount of coercion (mostly 
channeling), the insurgents attempted to coerce the population into compliance, 
hoping to increase their alignment.  
                                            
127 It could be argued that the insurgent percentage is high; however, the two parameters are 
held constant for this examination. Additionally, Figure 31 demonstrates a very congruent 
analysis when all parameters from Figure 26 are allowed to run. 
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Figure 30.   Effects of Changing Parameters (Late Transition). 
d. Analysis of Alignment and Trends Longitudinally 
During each timeframe, depth and social embeddedness remained 
constant, consistent with the game theoretical approach. Figure 31 illustrates the 
modulation in population alignment128 by allowing all parameters from Figure 26 
to vary. 
                                            
128 The population aligned government was sorted smallest to largest, while maintaining the 
integrity of the parameters achieving the population alignment number. By sorting the population-
aligned government smallest to largest, it was possible to determine trends that modulated the 
population alignment over the entire time period. 
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Figure 31.   Effects and Trends of Changing Parameters on Population 
Alignment. 
The population-aligned government was sorted smallest to 
largest,129 while maintaining the integrity of the parameters achieving the 
population alignment number. Sorting the population-aligned government 
smallest to largest provided trends that modulated the population alignment over 
the entire time period, Figure 31. The trends suggest a change in repression 
strategies played a large role in the population’s alignment with the government. 
However, the other parameters have a significant effect on the modulation of 
population alignment as determined by the individual analysis of each timeframe. 
Although, the trends provide insight to the mechanisms and processes that affect 
interacting repression strategies, the issue has not been completely addressed 
                                            
129 Sorting the governments alignment did not detract from the trends illustrated in Figure 31. 
For simplification, an assumption that the GOI/US increased population alignment on the macro 
level, results in a more visually appealing figure. 
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with the ABM. The coercion parameters are held constant to demonstrate the 
effects of the mechanisms and processes on the strategic interaction model. 
2. Using the ABM to Understand the Strategic Interaction Model 
The previous section has demonstrated that the interaction of repression 
tactics have a significant effect on population alignment. How the mechanisms 
and processes affect the link between interacting repression strategies and 
population alignment is illustrated next. Empirical observations derived from 
process tracing the case study revealed congruancy with the theoretical 
framework; however, channeling versus channeling was not observed at the 
macro level in the case study.  
The game theoretic framework ended with a constant sum game resulting 
in three weak equilibriums; the exact same three cells observed in the case 
study. The ABM is now utilized to explain why the equilibria in game theory are 
weak, and what the optimal parameter settings are to achieve each cell of the 
strategic interaction model. Figure 32 provides the parmeter settings for the 
experiment.130 
 
Figure 32.   Parameter Settings for the Strategic Interaction Model. 
                                            
130 Vision and density were held constant for this experiment. A separate experiment is ran 
to test vision and density, Figure 38. Initial experiments with vision and density result in an impact 
to the modulation of population alignment. However, it was determined that the impact did not 
detract from the findings of this experiment. Additionally, for the simplicity of illustrating the 
findings, the effects of breadth were not illustrated in the figures referring to the strategic 
interaction model. Instead, a separate illustration on the effects of breadth is found in Figure 37.  
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a. Cell One of the Strategic Interaction Model 
Cell one of the strategic interaction model suggests a framenting 
population, aligning with neither the government nor the insurgency. As the 
government and insurgency rely on coercion, it forces all three parties farther 
away from each other. Figure 33 illustrates how coercion-coercion is modulated 
by the mechanisms and processes.  
 
 
Figure 33.   Modulation of Population Alignment Coercion-Coercion. 
Additionally, the parameter settings with the most effect131 on 
population alignment are overlaid on the population alignment chart. The AMB 
suggests the absence of government depth and insurgent social embeddedness 
corresponds to the largest fragmented population. Of the two, the absence of 
insurgent social embeddedness has the greatest affect except when the 
government has 100% depth. Moreover, the insurgency secures population 
                                            
131 Government depth and insurgent social embeddedness had the most significant effect on 
the modulation of population alignment throughout the experiment on the strategic interaction 
model.  
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alignment with little social embeddedness when the government has a total 
absence of depth. The ability for the insurgent to maintain population alignment 
utilizing coercion with little social embeddedness provides insight as to why 
insurgencies may be quick to resort to coercion. The ABM finds it difficult for the 
government to secure population alignment with coercion even with an 
insurgency having little social embeddedness, potentially explaining why 
coercion-coercion is a weak equilibrium. 
b. Cell Two of the Strategic Interaction Model 
Cell two of the strategic interaction model predicts a population 
aligned with the insurgent when the government is coercing and insurgent is 
channeling. Figure 34 demonstrates how the mechanisms and processes 
modulate population alignment from the insurgent to the government. 
 
 
Figure 34.   Modulation of Population Alignment Coercion-Channeling. 
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A totally embedded insurgency enjoys the greatest population 
alignment when it has the greatest amount of embeddedness. Also shown is the 
relationship between the mechanisms and processes and population alignment. 
The government can utilize coercion to its benefit, with a large amount of depth. 
When the insurgency falls to 40% embeddedness the fight for population 
alignment is very close with the government. This observation explains why the 
insurgent might shift from resource intensive channeling strategy to coercion. 
Referring back to Figure 33, the insurgent could improve alignment by changing 
to a coercive strategy. The weak equilibrium found at coercion-channeling, 
population aligned with the insurgency in the constant sum game, is explained by 
understanding the insurgent can improve by shifting to a coercive strategy, given 
social embeddedness falling below 40 percent.  
c. Cell Three of the Strategic Interaction Model 
The government channeling and insurgent coercing results in a 
population aligned with the government. Again, this is subject to the effects of the 
mechanisms and processes on the interaction of repression strategies. Figure 35 






Figure 35.   Modulation of Population Alignment Channeling-Coercion. 
The population favors the government when it has the most depth 
and the insurgent is not embedded. Again, refer to Figure 34. The government 
improves by switching to a coercive strategy132 when enjoying depth in excess of 
80 percent. This observation helps provide insight as to why channel-coercion 
and population aligned with government is a weak equilibrium. The insurgent’s 
social embeddedness can mitigate the expected effect of the government’s 
channeling.  
d. Cell Four of the Strategic Interaction Model 
Channeling versus channeling was unobserved in the case study at 
the macro level. The game theoretic framework suggests no equilibrium exists for 
channel-channel (cell 4). The ABM illustrates the modulation of population 
alignment when the government and insurgent channel, Figure 36. 
                                            
132 This implies the government switches to coercion and eradicates the problem, and then 
returns back to channeling. 
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Figure 36.   Modulation of Population Alignment Channeling-Channeling. 
The ABM predicts a close battle for population alignment when the 
insurgent enjoys 100% social embeddedness, Figure 36. As the government 
increases its depth, the population aligns government at an exponential rate. This 
lends credibility to the assumption of the incumbent possessing the advantage in 
maintaining population alignment. Additionally, it provides insight to why channel-
channel is not a likely equilibrium due to the insurgent’s ability to improve 
population alignment in their favor using coercion and their difficulty competing 
with resources. It also suggests that channeling cannot be a universal strategy 
because it is predicated upon an important antecedent condition: the insurgent’s 
social embeddedness must be compromised first for the counterinsurgent to win 
a resource game. 
e. The Effect of Government Breadth 
The preceding discussion on the modulation of population 
alignment as it pertains to the strategic interaction model focused primarily on 
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government depth and insurgent social embeddedness. However, Figure 37 
depicts the role government breath plays in the modulation of population 
alignment as well.  
 
 
Figure 37.   Effects of Breadth on Population Alignment. 
The ABM suggests additional government breadth increases their 
population alignment when the government is utilizing coercion. The inverse 
relationship between the government’s channeling and breadth suggests that 
channeling needs to be implemented locally (lack of breadth). This dynamic is 
also apparent in channeling and channeling where the government’s increasing 
breadth is counterproductive to inducing a favorable alignment. While the 
government enjoys resource superiority in cell 4, increasing breadth dampens 
the advantage, highlighting the importance of locally implementing channeling. 
Another possible explanation for this observation is the lack of cost incurred by 
the insurgent when the government is channeling. 
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f. Testing Vision and Density 
The effects of vision and density are determined with a separate 
experiment while holding all other parameters constant,133 Figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 38.   Parameter Settings for Testing Vision and Density. 
The experiment suggests vision has an effect as the government 
improves when vision is at the lowest, Figure 39. A possible explanation is the 
government does not experience the effects of repression perceived as 
illegitimate when vision is at its lowest. In essence, the government’s coercion is 
covert, and thus, not generating social incentives for the population to align with 
the insurgent. Conversely, the vision is not always in favor of the insurgent either. 
With the vision at six or higher, the insurgent experiences a loss in population 
alignment. A plausible explanation could be the requirement to maintain 
                                            
133 The parameter settings of the experiment have equal organizational capacity and 
opportunity to coerce or channel.   
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legitimacy with their constituency reduces their ability to coerce behavior. In other 
words, high degrees of vision increase the cost of using coercion to achieve a 
favorable alignment for both the government and insurgent. Although the effect of 
vision appears small, by using the comparative values,134 vision can have a 
significant effect on population alignment. 
 
 
Figure 39.   Trends for the Effects of Vision. 
The ABM suggests population density is a factor in modulating 
population alignment, Figure 40. The effects appear small, but can have 
significant effects on how the population aligns. The insurgency appears to 
prosper in low-density populations, lending credibility to scholars supporting a 
rural approach to building an insurgency.  
 
                                            
134 Using the government’s comparative values as an example against a population of 
100,000 aligned with government. Government goes from 0.52 to 0.48 resulting in a loss of 
approximately 11,000 people; population aligned government drops to 98,916. 
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Figure 40.   Trends for the effects of population density. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The ABM provides external validity to the theoretical framework by 
modeling possible outcomes for the unobserved cell four of the strategic 
interaction model. Additionally, the ABM provides insight to the three weak 
equilibria demonstrated in the constant sum game of the game theoretic 
framework. Even if the GOI/US would have chosen to channel earlier in the battle 
over Anbar, the ABM suggests the insurgency would have maintained the upper 
hand. The GOI/US lacked the amount of depth and breadth to gain significant 
population alignment. The weak equilibrium at coercion-channel and population 
aligned with the insurgency is explained by the insurgent’s ability to shift to a 
coercive repression strategy and improving alignment.135 AQI effectively 
performed a shift to coercion-coercion and population aligned with the insurgency 
early in the transition as illustrated by the second weak equilibrium in the 
constant sum game, Figure 24. This equilibrium is weak because the government 
                                            
135 By maintaining at least 40% social embeddedness, the insurgency does well at coercion-
coercion, even when the government enjoys 60% depth. 
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can shift to channeling as demonstrated by Figure 35 and quickly gain alignment 
as depth is increased. When the government switches to channeling, this moves 
to the third weak equilibrium, channeling-coercion and population aligned with 
the government. This equilibrium is weak due to the government’s need to shift to 
a coercive strategy at times to maintain maximum population alignment.  
The ABM attempts to provide external validity and adds to the internal 
logic of the game theoretic framework.  
It is often wrongly assumed that the built-in nature of computational 
models somehow constrains the potential insights that such 
methods can generate. Agent-based models offer a new theoretical 
portal from which to explore complex adaptive social systems. Their 
advantages appear well suited, and perhaps even necessary, for 
helping us to understand better the types of problems that arise in 
the study of complex adaptive social systems. (Miller & Page, 2007, 
pp. 69, 78) 
Assumptions were made for simplification to build the ABM to include the 
mechanisms and processes and allowing for common knowledge. Even after 
assumptions from the theoretical framework are relaxed, the model produces 
results congruent with the process tracing and game theoretic framework. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Anbar experience illustrates that indigenous proxies can play a 
critical role in eradicating jihadist terrorist, appearing to vindicate 
the ‘indirect approach’ to counter-terrorism that was advocated in 
the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review. (Quadrennial 
Defense Review, 2006) 
 
A.  CONGRUENCE 
This thesis has attempted to answer the following question; is there a 
relationship between the government and insurgent repression strategies and the 
population’s alignment? To answer this question, the authors built a typology of 
repression for both the insurgent and counterinsurgent that are competing to 
control the population. 
 
 
Figure 41.   Strategic Interaction Model (McCormick, 2008). 




 H1 Government Coercion, Insurgent Coercion, Population 
Fragments Alliances 
 H2 Government Coercion, Insurgent Channeling, Population Aligns 
with Insurgents 
 H3 Government Channeling, Insurgent Coercion, Population Aligns 
with Government 
 H4 Government Channeling, Insurgent Channeling, Population 
Aligns with Incumbent 
This thesis has demonstrated a great deal of congruence between the 
expected outcomes of the repression typology and the empirical observations 
made in Anbar case study, confirming the explanatory validity of the theory. From 
the fall of the Saddam Regime until 2005, the tribal population of Anbar aligned 
with the Sunni insurgency. The empirics demonstrate that the GOI/US utilized a 
coercive population control strategy, while the insurgency channeling efforts were 
winning the support of the tribal population, corresponding to cell three. With the 
elections of 2005, the insurgents, fearing a loss of their support base, opted for 
coercion to counter support for the democratic process. At the same time, the 
GOI/US maintained an indiscriminant, coercive counterinsurgency campaign. 
With both sides coercing, the tribal population fragmented, failing to support 
either the insurgency or the government. The author’s theory predicted when 
both sides coerce; the population would fragment alliances and move away, 
representing cell one. Additionally, they predicted this outcome to be 
unsustainable due to one side realizing the opportunity created to forge an 
alignment with the population. Game theory further supports the prediction by 
demonstrating a lack of equilibrium in cell one. In cell one, either side can 
improve their payoff by deviating from coercion to channeling, moving to cell two 
or three.  
With the alliance of AQI and the Tribes fragmented, the tribal leaders 
began to search for an alternative political order. The tribal leaders formed the 
Anbar Awakening and sought the support of the GOI/US. AQI responded by 
using increasing coercive measures. Recognizing the opportunity, the GOI/US 
began to channel through the tribal leaders, shifting the alliance of the tribal 
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members from AQI to the tribes; thus, aligned with the government. The 
observations support the hypothesis of the government channeling and the 
insurgents coercing resulting in an alignment as depicted in cell three. 
B.  LIMITATIONS 
The limitations to this thesis are in two major areas: single case study and 
lack of discussion on ideological and/or cultural dimensions. The research design 
has captured and explained the longitudinal variation of the dependent variable 
(population alignment), but lacks the cross sectional dimension of multiple case 
studies. Therefore, the subjectivity of the predictions is arguable. In the case 
study, an absence of empirical evidence exists that corresponds to cell four. 
Game theory suggests the population is indifferent when the strategies are 
channel-channel. This supports the assumptions of the population aligning with 
incumbent and competitions of resources. In addition, game theory indicates 
Cells 2 and 3 are weak equilibriums; the insurgency or government, respectively, 
must make a strategic mistake to lose population alignment. On the other hand, 
game theory fails to predict equilibrium at channel-channel. This is likely a result 
of one side realizing they cannot win a competition of resources and 
consequently deviating to coercion.  
Realizing the limitations of a single case study, game theory and agent-
based modeling was applied to add external validity to the modeled predictions. 
Ideological and cultural dimensions affect the mechanisms and processes that 
account for the shifting population alignment. While an attempt was made to 
capture the ideological dimension with the social, moral and public goods 
incentives, it remains well beyond the scope of this thesis.136  
 
                                            
136 Andrew Phillips addresses the ideological and cultural dimensions in “How Al Qaeda Lost 
Iraq.” A detailing understanding why the insurgent chooses to use coercion or channeling is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. While fully appreciating the importance of the cultural and 
ideological dimensions of repression, the main concern was the strategic interaction of repression 
and understanding why and how the population aligns in response. 
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C.  FEASIBILITY 
The feasibility of implementing a strategy consistent with the theoretical 
concept addresses three areas: the form of the supported government, the 
amount of time required, and difficultly in developing a metric to measure 
successes of the strategy. 
After defeating the regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. embarked on 
a journey to build strong central governments, accountable to their people that 
are capable of providing governance. The form of government chosen to build, in 
a mirror image of the U.S., may not pass the test of time. With a “constitutionally” 
strong central government comes the requirement to have the institutions of 
government that are responsive to the needs of people. Therefore, it is 
necessary to change the perspective, build the capacity of the security forces to 
provide security for its people, build the capacity of the government to provide 
governance, and to respond to insurgent violence. In Iraq and Afghanistan, there 
are traditions of resisting central control (Johnson and Mason, 2008). In these 
societies, the traditional norms of social control emanates from local, tribal, 
and/or district level. In Iraq, it is the tribal leaders, and in Afghanistan, it is the 
council of elders or jirga.  
The theoretical concept addresses grass-root efforts to build societal 
control by focusing on the individual and meso-level mobilization processes. In 
Iraq, it took a GOI/US shift in policy, to engage and empower tribal leaders.137 To 
repeat the strategy in Afghanistan, it may require the U.S. to admit it is wrong to 
develop a strong central authority and shift to a federated system that shares 
power with constituent political units. Johnson and Mason identify the problems 
with the strong central government approach that is inconsistent with societal 
norms. 
                                            
137 Previously, the U.S. would not formally engage the Sunni tribes in fear of creating 
organizations that could possibly threaten the efforts to create a viable and legitimate Iraqi 
government. 
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The paradigm that has formed the backbone of the international 
effort since 2003—extending the reach of the central government—
is in fact precisely the wrong strategy. Politically and strategically, 
the most important level of governance in Afghanistan is neither 
national nor regional nor provincial. Afghan identity is rooted in the 
woleswali: the districts within each province that are typically home 
to a single clan or tribe. Historically, unrest has always bubbled up 
from this stratum. (2008) 
The amount of time required to quell an insurgency and the need to 
measure success affect the political will to fight. Adding troops without properly 
employing them exacerbates the problem. The most important resource may well 
be time and patience. To build a government from an idea and for the people to 
embrace it in a feudal society like Afghanistan takes time. With time comes the 
requirement to show the U.S. population progress. Johnson and Mason illustrate 
the flawed metrics, “American effort in Afghanistan resembles the Vietnam War—
with its emphasis on body counts and air strikes, its cross-border sanctuaries, 
and its daily tactical victories that never affected the slow and eventually decisive 
erosion of rural support for the counterinsurgency” (2008). Progress is not 
impossible to assess, but should capture the sentiment of the people with respect 
to their government. The Asia Foundation recently produced a survey of the 
Afghan people that serves as a basis for assessing the Afghan government and 
U.S. efforts to defeat an insurgency and provide governance for their people 
(Rennie, Sharma, & Sen, 2009). 
D.  POTENTIAL AREAS OF APPLICATION 
The authors do not contend that the theory for achieving population 
alignment is universal. The potential areas of application will be determined 
through analysis of the social environment to determine if the conditions exist to 
channel support away from the insurgency. 
The analysis begins by identifying the mobilizing structures of the relevant 
population. This starts with identification of the nodes of influence found in 
individuals, groups, and organizations. The concept has more applicability when 
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the nodes are decentralized. Decentralization provides multiple nodes, as a focus 
of the channeling efforts, as opposed to centralization, provides only one option. 
When decentralized, societal control is at the lowest level (tribe, jirga, district, 
etc.). In Afghanistan, “re-empowering the village councils of elders and restoring 
their community leadership is the only way to re-create the traditional check 
against the powerful political network of rural mullahs, who have been radicalized 
by the Taliban” (Johnson & Mason, 2008). This in an opportunity to conduct 
culturally consistent channeling that supports the development of local 
governance and security.  
Channeling is effective in both web like and hierarchal societal control 
mechanisms, but consideration is required when developing a channeling 
strategy. In Iraq, the web-like AQI network was overlaid on an informal hierarchal 
tribal network. This resulted in competing nodes of influence for control of the 
Sunni population. Once displaced, the tribal leaders viewed an alliance with the 
GOI/US more favorable than submitting to AQI. In Afghanistan, the dynamics of 
the radicalized mullahs and the local jirgas present a similar opportunity to wrest 
control from the Taliban. The radical mullahs, madrassas, and Taliban, the local 
node of influence to provide societal control, have displaced the jirgas and tribal 
elders. [The tribes are] “predisposed to support the Taliban, which espouses an 
alien and intolerant form of Islam, and goes against the grain of traditional 
respect for elders and decision by consensus. Re-empowering the village 
coun-cils of elders and restoring their community leadership is the only way to re-
create the traditional check against the powerful political network of rural mullahs, 
who have been radicalized by the Taliban” (Johnson & Mason, 2008). The 
problem becomes how to convince the people to return to traditional societal 
norms in the face of Taliban presence when the people and the insurgents are 
one in the same. 
Heterogeneous insurgent supporting populations are more susceptible 
than homogenous populations to the channeling efforts of the counterinsurgent. 
Inherently, heterogeneous populations have potential differences that provide 
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rifts for disaggregating groups and organizations supporting the insurgents. 
Efforts should focus on separating the various groups and developing specific 
strategies for targeting the social environment that supports insurgent activity. At 
a minimum, the counterinsurgent must not allow his actions to unify groups and 
organizations in opposition to him.  
Kilcullen speaks of the need to disaggregate insurgencies: finding 
ways to address local grievances in Pakistan’s tribal areas or along 
the Thai-Malay border so that they aren’t mapped onto the 
ambitions of the global jihad. Kilcullen writes, Just as the 
Containment strategy was central to the Cold War, likewise a 
disaggregation strategy would provide a unifying strategic 
conception for the war—something that has been lacking to date. 
(Love, 2006) 
As shown in the typology of repression, channeling can be used to induce 
disaggregation among heterogeneous groups that support the insurgent through 
selective incentives and empowerment or directly against the insurgent by cutting 
resource flows. Both increase the cost of control for the insurgent. This requires 
the insurgent to compete against the counterinsurgent to co-op certain groups 
and costs the insurgent more should he decide to use channeling. When the 
insurgent’s resource flows are compromised, he is more likely to use a more 
cost-efficient method of population control: coercion.  
There are numerous benefits to using channeling. The disaggregation 
achieved through channeling assists building counterinsurgent coalitions. It 
provides additional security forces and increased intelligence to make 
discriminate coercion legitimate and precise. Channeling amplifies the resources 
advantage of the counterinsurgent and likely compels the insurgent to resort to 
coercion for population control. Lastly, it is likely the insurgent will loose his 
legitimacy over time and the population will align with the counterinsurgent. 
In Iraq, AQI created the opportunity for the U.S. to channel the tribes 
effectively. However, understanding the dynamics aligning the population with 
the insurgents allows the counterinsurgent to operationalize channeling 
systemically. Channeling against the insurgent is used to disrupt the flow of 
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resources and to induce coercion. Channeling the population includes positive 
incentives, material and economic, for meso-level leaders to increase their 
influence on the population. 
Channeling is not always the ideal repression tactic to control populations. 
Channeling must be consistent to achieve the desired effects. Channeling from a 
negotiating position of strength is consistent; however, channeling from a 
negotiating position of weakness is a concession. Concessions138 can increase 
mobilization by increasing the extent of cognitive liberation (Snow, Rochford, 
Worden, & Beford, 1986, p. 466).  Namely, the insurgent may interpret 
concessions as signals that its use of coercion will go unchallenged139  An 
example of a concession made by the GOI/US would be the agreements reached 
with insurgent leaders in Fallujah in April 2004. Insurgent leaders were able to 
negotiate an end to the siege of Fallujah prematurely ending GOI/US offensive 
operations to clear the city. The embolden Sunni insurgency believed that they 
could defeat the GOI/US and this perception led to increased support throughout 
the Anbar. In contrast, the channeling used to empower and influence the Anbar 
tribal leaders in 2006 came from an advantageous position. The tribal leaders 
needed support to reestablish their traditional role in the tribes and the GOI/US 
support was well received and achieved the intended result of displacing AQI. 
                                            
138 Concessions involve low-level accommodations (procedural) that reflect the 
government’s attempt to negotiate with designated leaders of the opposition and high-level 
accommodations (substantive) are attempts to co-opt the challenging group leaders and their 
political platforms (Rasler, 1996; Gamson, 1990).  
139 Value expectancy models argue that when people be-come convinced that their 
participation in collective action is likely to achieve a collective good, they are more likely to 
dissent. Government concessions enhance this perception and increase the probability that 
people will join in mass actions (Rasler, 1996, p. 145). 
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